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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores several related issues surrounding second 
order logic. The central problem running throughout is whether second 
order logic should provide the underlying logic for formalizations of 
natural language. A prior problem is determining the significance of 
this choice. 
Such controversies over the adoption of a logic usually involve 
assessing the merits of challengers to first order logic. In some of 
these rival systems various first order logical truths do not hold. 
The failure of the Law of the Excluded Middle in intuitionistic systems 
is the most common example. The other alternatives to first order 
logic accept it as a part of the truth, but extend it by adding new 
logical constants. Some modal systems of logic are formed by adding 
to first order logic a symbol intended to be read as 'it is logically 
necessary that.' The first order semantics is extended to provide 
truth conditions for sentences containing this new symbol. In such 
cases the debate is whether we are justified in expanding the list of 
logical constants provided by first order logic. We accept the first 
order logical constants and are deciding whether, e.g., *it is logical-
ly necessary that' should be added to the list. 
Second order logic is such an extension of first order logic, 
treating quantification over properties as a logical constant. There 
are individual variables to range over objects in the domain of an in-
terpretation and predicate variables to range over properties of those 
objects. The formal semantics is provided in set theory. An interpre-
tation of a second order language is identical with an interpretation 
of its first order sublanguage, with the predicate variables ranging 
over the powerset of the domain. If P is a predicate variable and x 
is an individual variable, then the formula Px is satisfied, relative 
to an assignment to the variables of the language, just in case the 
element of the domain assigned to x is a member of the subset of the 
domain assigned to P. Other formulas containing predicate variables 
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have the satisfaction conditions one would expect. Our main concern is 
whether first order logic should be extended in this way. 
In Chapter II we will describe a second order language and its 
semantics in some detail, but first the intuitive notion of property 
employed in second order logic must be clear. This is the notion of 
properties as arbitrary collections. Given a totality T, what are the 
properties of the elements of T as construed by second order logic? 
These properties satisfy the following two claims. First, for each ar-
bitrary collection of elements of T there is a property possessed by 
precisely those objects. Second, no two distinct properties are each 
possessed by the same objects, that is, properties are extensional. 
For any totality T, the properties of members of T correspond precisely 
to the subtotalities of T and an object possesses a property if and 
only if it is a member of the corresponding subtotality. Accordingly, 
we identify the properties with the subtotalities or arbitrary collec-
tions of elements of T and identify possessing a property with member-
ship. If T is a set, then the properties we quantify over in second 
order logic are just the subsets of T. 
We must keep this conception of property in mind so that our dis-
cussion of second order logic is not obscured by considerations only 
relevant to other conceptions. Most well-known are intensional notions, 
where distinct properties may be true of the same objects. Quine has 
argued extensively that intensional properties are unacceptable since 
they lack a criterion of individuation. One holding this view might 
criticize second order logic on the grounds that quantification over 
properties is unclear, but this would be a mistake. In second order 
logic properties are not intensional. Like sets, properties conceived 
as arbitrary collections are individuated by an extensionality criterion. 
Similarly, second order logic does not receive support if some 
other notion of property proves useful. Lately there has been interest 
in the view that there does not always exist a property true of each 
member of an arbitrary collection. We feel that such objects may not 
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have anything in common and that only certain collections can be defined 
by what we could call a real property. Many explicate this concept by 
providing a theory of physical properties, although other versions are 
possible. Beyond appeals to intuition, such conceptions of property are 
defended by their usefulness in solving various philosophical problems. 
For example, a satisfactory concept of physical property seems to make 
possible an account of natural laws. Belief in the need for quantifica-
tion over real properties of some sort may tempt one to cite this in 
defense of second order logic, but the philosophical importance of some 
notion of real property is irrelevant to the choice between first and 
second order logic. 
The nature of logical theory is the topic of Chapter I. We argue 
that the two problems for a logical theory are to provide a precise 
account of logical consequence through a theory of logical form and to 
characterize inference. Modern logical theories attempt to solve these 
problems by translating natural language into a formal language for 
which we have precise characterizations of logical form and inference. 
In Chapter II we describe a system L2 of second order logic and 
establish some simple relationships between second and first order lan-
guages. We show that given any second order theory there is a corres-
ponding first order theory in which the same assertions can be expressed 
and proven. First and second order languages differ in their account of 
logical form as expressed in their definitions of truth under an inter-
pretation. 
Chapter III examines Frege's logical theories and explains why 
the first modem systems of logic were second order. The explanation is 
not that Frege simply thought set theory was part of logic. Beyond the 
error in identifying second order logic with set theory, we show that 
Frege had a good justification for his second order systems based on his 
analysis of language into the application of function to argument. 
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Some feel that the lack of a complete proof procedure for a logic 
is a reason to reject it. Although the most common versions of this 
view are not correct, in Chapter IV we show that the existence of a 
recognizably complete proof procedure for first order logic shows that 
it avoids certain undesirable epistemological consequences of second 
order logic. These undesirable consequences are the basis of an argu-
ment against second order logic, but this argument assumes controversial 
views concerning scientific methodology and the limits of human 
knowledge. 
In Chapter V we present a different criticism of second order 
logic. We argue that our ability to quantify over ever larger totali-
ties shows that any collection may be treated as an object. Quantifica-
tion over the powerset of a set is never correctly formalized as second 
order. Logical theories based on second order logic thus provide an 
incorrect account of logical form, and we show that other higher order 
logics are subject to the same criticism. 
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CHAPTER I 
Before discussing the specific controversy surrounding second 
order logic, we consider the general problem of the nature of a logical 
theory. What are the problems a logical theory attempts to solve? Why 
have logical theories taken the form they have? These questions are 
intrinsically interesting, and our answers will prove useful in the fol-
lowing chapters. The main tasks of a logical theory are seen to be 
providing precise accounts of the relations of logical consequence and 
inference. We characterize our informal concept of these relations and 
show how modem logical theories attempt to explicate them. 
We start by considering arguments. Typically, a person presents 
an argument in order to establish the truth of its conclusion. The 
other sentences of the argument are intended to provide support for this 
conclusion. These sentences are either premisses, to be accepted on the 
basis of common knowledge, or else they are supported by other sentences 
in the argument. In the latter case, the argument is complex, contain-
ing an argument as a proper part. We can confine our attention to 
simple arguments in which all sentences other than the conclusion are 
premisses. 
In a good argument the truth of the premisses makes the conclusion 
more probable. In some arguments, however, the relation between the pre-
misses and the conclusion is particularly strong, for the truth of the 
premisses—in some sense we want to explicate—guarantees the truth of 
the conclusion. For example, the truth of (1) 'If Sam is a politician, 
then Sam is unscrupulous' and (2) 'Sam is a politician' guarantees that 
(3) 'Sam is unscrupulous' is also true. 
This example has another interesting property. The relation be-
tween the premisses and the conclusion, whereby the truth of the pre-
misses guarantees the truth of the conclusion, seems to depend only on 
the logical form of the sentences involved and not on their particular 
content. The truth value of a sentence clearly depends on more than 
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just the meaning of its significant parts. 'Sam hit Slim' may be true 
while 'Slim hit Sam' is false. The structure of the sentence is also 
relevant. The logical form is the structure which, together with the 
meaning of the significant parts of a sentence, determines its truth value. 
In our example, the relation whereby the truth of (1) and (2) guarantee the 
truth of (3) is only sensitive to the logical form of these sentences. That 
they are about Sam, politicians and lack of scruples is unimportant. Only 
their logical form is relevant. This relation also holds if the sentences 
are 'If John is an acrobat, then John is agile', 'John is an acrobat, John 
is agile'; 'If Bob is a cat burglar, then there are not enough police,' 
'Bob is a cat burglar,' 'There are not enough police'; and so on. These 
groups of sentences all seem to have a certain structure in common which 
we might represent as 'If A, then B,' 'A,' 'B.' Considering further ex-
amples will quickly convince one that in any argument with this general 
form the truth of the premisses guarantees the truth of the conclusion. 
When the truth of each member of a set X of sentences guarantees 
the truth of a sentence A solely by virtue of their logical form, we say 
that A is a logical consequence of X. In the arguments we have consid-
ered the conclusion was a logical consequence of the set of premisses. 
Such arguments are thus different from those in which the truth of the 
conclusion is guaranteed by the truth of the premisses, but where more 
than the form of the sentences is involved. For instance, one might ar-
gue that the truth of 'John is a bachelor' guarantees the truth of 'John 
is male,' due to the meaning of 'bachelor.' Yet this relation is not 
formal. In constructing a logical theory we are interested in character-
izing the (formal) relation of logical consequence. 
One of the two fundamental problems facing a logical theory is to 
provide a precise characterization of the relation of logical conse-
quence. Given our informal concept of this relation, an acceptable ac-
count of logical consequence must at least meet the following demands. 
First, it must characterize a consequence relation between sets X = 
XA : iel^ of sentences and single sentences A satisfying the condition i 
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that if all the x. are true then so is A. The observation that the rela-
tion of logical consequence holds solely in virtue of the logical form of 
the sentences involved justifies the second demand. An account of logi-
cal consequence must provide a theory of logical form and show that the 
consequence relation is only sensitive to the logical form of sentences. 
An account of logical form must specify a vocabulary and a stock of con-
structions adequate to generate all sentences of the language and show 
how the truth value of each sentence results from its particular conqjosi-
tion from elements of the vocabulary. An account of logical form thus is 
a theory of truth for the language.1 For the relation R claimed to be 
the consequence relation, a logical theory must iiiq)ly that if R(X,A) and 
if A',X' =yxi': ielV are such that A' and each xi' have the same logical 
form as A and xi, then R(X',A'). 
Of course, any logical theory which fulfills these conditions does 
not thereby provide a correct account of logical consequence. To take an 
extreme case, a logical theory could define R to be the empty relation. 
R then trivially satisfies these conditions, whatever our theory of logi-
cal form. But to be acceptable, a characterization of logical conse-
quence must cohere with our intuitions. As usual, if we have good reason 
we will conclude that some of our intuitions are mistaken. If a logical 
theory agrees with virtually none of our intuitions, however, then the 
concept of form and the relation of consequence it defines are not the 
concept of logical form and the relation of logical consequence in which 
we are interested. 
Before the invention of formal languages, there were tremendous 
obstacles to providing a theory of logical form for natural language. 
The principal problem was the bewildering variety of logically equivalent 
constructions in natural language. For example, we feel that 'if A, then 
B' has the same logical form as 'if A, B,' 'A, only if B,' and so on. 
Finding a way to provide a general account of the logical form of the 
sentences of natural language might appear to be a hopeless task. This 
difficulty received a brilliant solution with the invention of formal 
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languages. In a formal language we have a precise specification of the 
primitive symbols and of the constructions by which complex expressions 
are formed. We then specify how each construction contributes to the 
truth value or denotation of complex expressions in which it occurs. 
Finally, we frame a definition of logical consequence applying directly 
to sentences of this formal language. 
Our goal is to find a formal language into which we can translate 
the sentences of natural language in such a way that it provides a model 
of logical form and consequence for natural language. For a formal sen-
tence A to be a translation, or formalization, of a natural language 
sentence B they must have the same truth conditions.^ By identifying 
the logical form and consequence relation of natural language with that 
projected on it by a formalization into a formal language, we get an ac-
count of logical form and logical consequence in natural language. If 
this identification is correct, we say that this is a correct formaliza-
tion of natural language. If A',xi' are correct formalizations of A,Xj^, 
then A',xi' have the same logical form as A,xi and A' is a logical con-
sequence of X' =fx3^ ': ielj just in case A is a logical consequence of 
X = £xi: ielj. Our aim is to find a formal language permitting a cor-
rect formalization of natural language. 
Some formal languages do not contain formalization of certain 
sentences of natural language. For example, no first order language 
contains a formalization of 'It is logically necessary that 2+5 = 7.' 
More relevant to our concern with second order logic, there may be 
formalizations of a natural language sentence in a formal language, but 
no correct formalization. If (4) 'There is a set of natural numbers 
containing 0' is valid, i.e., a logical consequence of the empty set, 
then no sentence of a first order language correctly formalizes it. 
There are first order sentences with the same truth conditions as (4), 
but they are nonlogical truths. 
Since Tarski's seminal work on model theory, definitions of logi-
cal consequence for formal languages have employed the notions of an 
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interpretation of the language and of the truth of a sentence under an 
interpretation. An interpretation of a formal language L is an ordered 
pair <,D,F^ , where D is a domain for the individual variables of L to 
range over and F is a function whose domain is a subset of the primitive 
symbols of L.^ The symbols in the domain of F are the nonlogical symbols 
of L, usually the relation symbols, functions symbols and constants. F 
assigns a meaning to each of these symbols, that is, a set of n-tuples of 
members of D to each n-place relation symbol, an n-place function from D 
into D to each n-place function symbol and a member of D to each constant. 
The definition of truth under an interpretation is a recursive 
definition of the truth conditions of each sentence relative to an inter-
pretation of the language. Those constructions deemed constitutive of 
the logical form of sentences make the same contribution to the truth 
conditions of sentences in which they occur, regardless of the interpre-
tation. The constant meaning of these constructions is specified in the 
basis and recursion clauses of the definition of truth under an interpre-
tation. For example, the basis clause of the usual definition for first 
order languages says that a sentence of the form Gb is true under an 
interpretation .^D,F^ if and only if F(b)eF(G). The meaning of b and G 
can change from interpretation to interpretation, but predication is 
always interpreted as set membership. Similarly, in such definitions 
sentences of the form A A B are true under an interpretation I if and only 
if A is true under I and B is true under I. Thus, A is always inter-
preted as conjunction. 
By providing an account of the interpretations of L and a recur-
sive characterization of truth under an interpretation, we provide a spe-
cification of the logical form of the sentences in L. The sentences of L 
are generated from the primitive predicate symbols, function symbols and 
constants by the application of precisely specified constructions. For 
any interpretation of L, the definition of truth under an interpretation 
tells us the contribution these constructions make to determining the 
truth value of sentences in which they occur. We define the relation of 
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logical consequence for L by using the notion of truth under an interpre-
tation. A sentence A is a logical consequence of a set X of sentences of 
L if and only if A is true under every interpretation under which all the 
members of X are true. A is valid, or a logical truth, if and only if A 
is a logical consequence of the empty set. Such definitions satisfy the 
requirement that logical consequence be a formal relation, that is, de-
pend only on those features of sentences of L which the semantics deems 
part of their logical form. Since the meaning of the relation symbols, 
function symbols and constants varies from interpretation to interpreta-
tion, by considering all interpretations under which sentences are true 
we abstract from all but their logical form. The meaning of the nonlogi-
cal symbols is irrelevant, since the definition of logical consequence 
does not mention the actual interpretation of the language. 
Although the usual definitions of logical consequence for formal 
languages accord with many of our intuitions, one may doubt whether such 
a definition can explicate our intuitive concept of logical consequence. 
An interpretation is a set and definitions of logical consequence are 
given in set theory, usually Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom 
of Choice. Prior to the discovery of Russell's Paradox, a strong compre-
hension principle for sets was assumed. This comprehension principle was 
(3x) (Vy) [yex^Py] , 
where P stands for any property and the quantifiers range over all sets. 
That is, for any property there exists a set containing just the sets 
having this property. A second assumption was that any predicate defi-
nitely true or false of each individual set stands for a property of sets. 
From these assumptions the existence of the set of all sets follows by 
letting P stand for y = y. Russell's Paradox showed that these two 
assumptions are inconsistent. If we take P to be yj:y, the comprehsnion 
principle assures us that there is a set x of all non-self-membered sets, 
but then xeX'^ xl^ X* 
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Two paths were open: one could retain the unrestricted comprehen-
sion principle but hold that some expressions seeming to express proper-
ties do not, e.g., because they are actually ill-formed; or one could 
abandon the unrestricted comprehension principle and replace it with one 
or more weaker principles. Russell took the first path in his theory of 
types. The unrestricted comprehension principle is retained, but re-
strictions on the means of expression prevent the formation of trouble-
some predicates like y^y. The second approach was Zermelo's. He re-
placed the unrestricted comprehension principle with the axiom of subsets: 
(Vz) (3x) (X/y) [yex-«-v(yezAPy)], where P stands for any definite property of 
sets. The effect is to maintain the comprehension principle for all pro-
perties expressible by predicates of the form (yeb)APy, for some set b. 
On both approaches, the collection of all sets is not itself a 
set. Since the domain of any interpretation is a set, under no interpre-
tation do the individual variables of a formal language range over all 
sets. Two difficulties with standard set theoretic formulations of model 
theory follow. In set theory we seem to make statements about all sets. 
This view is controversial, and in the final chapter we will discuss an 
alternative to it. But if correct, the usual model theoretic semantics 
cannot provide an account of the meaning of set theoretic statements. 
A related difficulty concerns model theoretic definitions of logi-
cal consequence. Georg Kreisel has argued^ that when we say A is valid 
we don't mean merely that it is true under any interpretation as that 
notion is defined in set theory. We also mean that A is true when its 
variables range over collections that are not sets. If A contains a sin-
gle binary predicate H, then we believe that it is true when its individ-
ual variables range over all sets and H is construed as the membership 
relation. Those interpretations satisfying a model theoretic definition 
might be called set theoretic interpretations, since the domain, rela-
tions and functions they provide are sets. Interpretations which are not 
sets, like the one we just gave to A, we will call non-set theoretic. 
Analogously, we can speak of set theoretic consequence and validity. 
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Kreisel's claim is that our intuitive concept of validity is truth under 
all interpretations, both set theoretic and non-set theoretic. Since set 
theoretic definitions of validity ignore non-set theoretic interpreta-
tions they fail to explicate our intuitive concept of validity. 
Despite these defects in model theoretic definitions of validity, 
Kreisel shows that intuitive validity and set theoretic validity coincide 
in extension for first order formulas. Let Prov be the set of formulas 
provable in some standard proof procedure for the first order predicate 
calculus, SVal the set of set theoretically valid formulas and IVal the 
set of intuitively valid formulas, i.e., those true under all interpre-
tations. Restricting our attention to first order formulas, we have 
Prov Q. IVal, 
since we can see that the axioms of standard proof procedures for first 
order logic are intuitively valid and that their rules of inference pre-
serve intuitive validity. If a sentence is true under all interpretations, 
it clearly is true under all set theoretic interpretations, that is, 
IVal Q. SVal. 
Godel's Completeness theorem established that 
SVal Q. Prov. 
Hence, 
SVal = IVal. 
Set theoretic validity and intuitive validity coincide in extension for 
first order formulas. 
Characterizing the logical consequence relation is one major task 
of a logical theory. A second is providing an account of inference. We 
began this chapter by considering arguments in which the conclusion is a 
logical consequence of the premisses. Such arguments are called valid 
arguments or proofs and the conclusion is said to be inferred or proven 
from the premisses. We saw that in such arguments the truth of the pre-
misses guarantees the truth of the conclusion in virtue of their logical 
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form. We then took this as our informal characterization of logical con-
sequence: A is a logical consequence of a set X if and only if the truth 
of the members of X guarantees the truth of A in virtue of their logical 
form. We began by noting a feature of valid arguments but then character-
ized a semantic relation without reference to arguments at all. 
The second fundamental problem facing a logical theory remains: 
characterize the inference relation. The conclusion of a valid argument 
is a logical consequence of the premisses. Beyond this necessary condi-
tion, however, there is a crucial epistemological component to our concept 
of a valid argument. Not only is the conclusion a consequence of the pre-
misses, but one can come to know this. We believe that if one knows the 
premisses of a valid argument then one can come to know its conclusion by 
seeing that the argument demonstrates that the conclusion follows logi-
cally from the premisses. Valid arguments are tools we use to expand 
our knowledge. 
Any acceptable account of inference must therefore meet two re-
quirements. First, if A is the conclusion of a valid argument, then it 
must be a logical consequence of the premisses. Further, the argument 
must enable one to recognize this. This epistemological requirement 
yields, as an immediate consequence, a finiteness constraint on valid 
arguments. Since human beings have finite capacities, no one can draw a 
conclusion from an infinite number of premisses or follow infinitely many 
steps in a line of reasoning. Thus, any valid argument must be of finite 
length. 
Since Frege's Begriffsschrift, attempted solutions to the inference 
problem have taken the form of providing a recursive proof procedure, or 
proof theory, for a formal language. A proof procedure consists of a set 
Ax of axioms and a set RI of rules of inference.^ A proof procedure is 
recursive if Ax is recursive and RI is a finite set of recursive rules.^ 
A formula A is provable from X if and only if there exists a finite se-
quence A^, . . ., A such that (1) each A^ is either a member of Ax U X or 
else results from the application of a rule in RI to earlier members of 
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the sequence and (2) A = A. Such a sequence is a proof. A formula 
provable from the empty set is simply said to be provable. The relation 
of being provable from a set and the concept of a formal proof are the 
explications provided of the inference relation and of the informal notion 
of a valid argument. As with formal characterizations of logical conse-
quence, we get an account of inference in natural language through 
formalization. 
An important assumption supports the view that any account of in-
ference must take the form of a recursive proof procedure. This assump-
tion is that only a recursively enumerable set of sentences can be known. 
It is plausible but has never been adequately defended. An appeal to 
intuition and Church's Thesis usually provide its support. In any ra-
tional reconstruction of our knowledge each sentence is either known 
directly or else recognized to be true by its relations to others known 
directly. Defenders of this view hold that the sentences known directly 
either must be finite in number or else be instances of a finite number 
of schemas, each known to have only true instances. Otherwise an infin-
ite number of irreducibly different principles would be evident, a situa-
tion claimed to be impossible.^ Similar intuitions support the claim 
that we come to know the remaining truths by seeing they follow from di-
rectly known truths by finitely many applications of a finite number of 
effective rules, each recognized to preserve truth. Only finitely many 
applications of these rules are permissible, since we can't follow in-
finite arguments. These rules must be finite in number, for infinitely 
many irreducibly different rules could not possibly be recognized to pre-
serve truth. They must be effective or else we may be unable to recog-
nize that a sentence follows from others by their means. 
Church's Thesis links the informal concept of an effective rule 
to the formal concept of a recursive rule. It states that a function is 
effectively computable if and only if it is recursive. If we assume 
Church's Thesis, we can conclude that the knowable truths are generated 
by a finite number of recursive rules, each recognized to preserve truth. 
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Since the set of instances of a finite number of schemas is recursive, the 
set of sentences generated from such a set is recursively enumerable. 
Adopting the assumption that the set of knowable truths is recur-
sively enumerable, we can construe the inference problem as the problem 
of finding a recursive proof procedure generating the formalizations of 
all inferences. This is not the problem of finding a complete proof pro-
cedure. A complete proof procedure generates all instances of the conse-
quence relation. A solution to the inference problem generates all 
recognizable instances of this relation. Though these problems are dis-
tinct, they are related as we shall discuss in Chapter IV. 
If an appropriate proof procedure is chosen, it can be seen to 
satisfy our two conditions on solutions to the inference problem. If we 
choose axioms that are valid and rules of inference that yield logical 
consequences of sentences to which they are applied, then our proof pro-
cedure is sound. In a sound proof procedure the conclusion of a proof 
is clearly a logical consequence of the premisses. A proof procedure 
will satisfy the second condition if we can recognize its soundness. 
The axioms must be obviously valid and the rules of inference seen to 
yield only logical consequences of sentences to which they are applied. 
Assuming that all recursive functions are effectively computable, we can 
effectively recognize any proof. If we know the proof procedure is sound, 
we can see that the conclusion of any proof is a logical consequence of 
the premisses. 
This proof theoretic approach to the inference problem employs 
idealizations common when providing rational reconstructions of our know-
ledge. The axioms in a proof procedure are all instances of a number of 
schemas. In such reconstructions we assume that we can effectively recog-
nize all instances of a schema, whatever their complexity. We also assume 
that for any finite sequence, we can determine whether it is a proof using 
our effective procedure to see if each sentence is either an axiom, a 
premiss or the result of applying one of the rules of inference. These 
are both idealizations. People cannot actually comprehend sentences or 
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follow proofs of arbitrary finite length. Due to limitations on attention 
and speed of recognition, there is a least finite number n such that no 
sentence containing more than n symbols will ever be seen to be an in-
stance of one of the axiom schemas of a formal system and such that no 
proof in such a system containing more than n symbols will ever be recog-
nized. But since we can easily imagine possible histories of the world 
in which n would not have this property, e.g., due to people having great-
er attention spans, we assume that the actual value of n is not essential. 
If an instance of a schema or a proof contains more than n symbols, we 
feel that it is at least potentially recognizable. 
On the other hand, we have required proofs to be of finite length. 
We feel that if people could comprehend proofs with infinitely many sym-
bols human beings would be quite different creatures than they are. One 
might even believe that creatures who could comprehend infinite proofs 
would, for that very reason, not be human. Such considerations explain 
the common feeling that it is natural to exclude infinite proofs, while 
allowing proofs of arbitrary finite length. 
We have identified the explication of logical consequence and the 
explication of inference as the major tasks of a logical theory. Current 
logical theories first formalize natural language and then characterize 
these relations for this formal language. In the following chapters we 
consider the view that this formal language should be second order. 
NOTES 
1. Donald Davidson has written extensively on this theme. See, 
e.g., his 'On Saying That,' Synthese 19 (1968-9), pp. 131-3. 
2. Michael Friedman makes a similar point concerning theoretical 
explications of concepts of physics in 'Grimbaum and the Conventionality 
of Geometry' in Space, Time and Geometry, ed. Patrick Suppes (Boston, 
1973), pp. 231-2. 
3. 'Truth conditions' will be given a precise meaning in the 
next chapter. Here it can be taken intuitively. 
4. For simplicity, we only consider one-sorted languages. 
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5. 'Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs' in The Philosophy of 
Mathematics, ed. Imre Lakatos (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 152-5. 
6. This terminology differs from Kreisel's. 
7. In natural deduction systems a proof procedure consists solely 
of rules of inference. 
8. When we speak simply of a 'proof procedure,' we will assume 
that it is recursive. 
9. For example, Hilary Putnam says that he finds this supposition 
'quite incredible.' See 'What Is Mathematical Truth?' in Mathematics, 
Matter and Method (London, 1975), p. 63. 
10. There are difficult issues concerning such formal analyses of 
our informal concept of inference. When intuitively valid arguments in 
natural language are formalized, they rarely go over into formal proofs. 
Even if all the steps are intuitively evident, each will usually be re-
presented by a number of applications of the formal rules of inference. 
One might try claiming that an argument in natural language is valid if 
the formalization of the conclusion can be formally proven from the for-
malization of the premisses. But if Goldbach's conjecture is formally 
provable from the first order Peano axioms, writing the English transla-
tions of a finite number of axioms sufficient for its proof and conclud-
ing 'Therefore, Goldbach's conjecture' would not constitute an informal 
proof. There are pragmatic constraints on how much of a formal proof 
may be omitted before we no longer have an informal proof. 
Pragmatic constraints may also limit the complexity of infor-
mal proofs. In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 65ff and 83-4, Wittgenstein argues that 
a formal proof containing thousands of lines is not an informal proof, 
since it cannot be comprehended as a whole. Proof may even be context-
dependent is a more radical sense. One could argue that in certain con-
texts Al, . . .,An, A constitutes an informal proof of A without A even 
being a logical consequence of Ai, . . .,An. A proponent of this view 
might argue that in proofs in physics the relevant mathematics is part 
of the context and need not be stated. (This last view was suggested by 
Paul Benacerraf.) 
We leave these issues aside since they concern all formal 
analyses of inference, whether first order or second order. 
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CHAPTER II 
In this chapter we describe second order logic and establish some 
simple relationships between second and first order languages. We show 
that given an interpreted language L of one sort, there is an interpreted 
language L' of the other and a one-one translation which preserves truth 
conditions. In one direction this conclusion is immediate since first 
order logic is a sublanguage of second order logic. The other direction 
results from our ability to express any statement about the subsets of 
a set in a first order language possessing a symbol for the membership 
relation and whose domain contains these subsets. We also show that 
given a theory T couched in L, there is a T' couched in L' such that a 
formula is provable in T if and only if its translation is provable in T'. 
Given axioms and rules of inference for L, we simply take their transla-
tions as the axioms and rules for L'. First and second order languages 
and theories thus do not differ on which statements are expressible or 
provable. 
First and second order logic differ in their conceptions of logi-
cal form, as expressed in their definitions of truth under an interpre-
tation. A second order sentence and its first order translation have the 
same truth conditions, but have a different logical form and differ in 
their place in the consequence relation. The differences between first 
and second order logic stem from this difference in logical form. 
We begin by describing second order logic (L2). Add denumerably 
many one-place predicate variables ?.,?^, . . . to some standard system 
of first order logic with identity. •'^  Alter the formation rules so that 
each p. can occur in place of one-place predicate letters and be bound 
by quantifiers. If x,.x^, . . . are the individual variables of first 
order logic, then we now have formulas like QP)Px.'^ 
An interpretation M of L2 is just an interpretation of its first 
order sublanguage. That is, M is an ordered pair ^D,F> , where D is 
the domain and F is a function mapping each constant, n-place function 
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symbol and n-place relation symbol to an element of D, an n-place function 
from D to D or an n-place relation over D, respectively. We define truth 
under an interpretation M recursively, using evaluations of the variables 
of L2. An evaluation i is a function mapping the individual and predicate 
variables of L2 to elements and subsets of D, respectively. The defini-
tion uses the standard notion of a formula being satisfied by an evalua-
tion. The clauses for the connectives and for quantification with respect 
to an individual variable are the same as for the first order languages. 
The clause for formulas of the form (3P) A(P) is 
QP) A(P) is satisfied by M = ^ D,F^ relative to evaluation 
i if and only if there is an evaluation i' such that A(P) 
is satisfied by M relative to i', where i and i' differ at 
most in that i(P)?^  i'(P). 
A sentence of the form OP) A(P) thus asserts that there exists a subset 
of the domain satisfying A(P) when assigned to P. The rest of the defin-
ition is identical to that for first order languages. 
We want to compare the expressive power of interpreted languages 
based on L2 with those based on first order logic. Is a statement ex-
pressible in a second order language if and only if it is expressible in 
a first order language? Two sentences express the same statement if they 
have the same truth conditions, and we can identify the truth conditions 
of a sentence with its truth definition. Two sentences have the same 
truth conditions if their respective truth definitions are identical or 
can be made so by substitution of co-referential terms. 
Since first order logic is a sublanguage of L2, one direction is 
immediate. An interpretation of a first order language is also an inter-
pretation of the corresponding second order language possessing the same 
nonlogical vocabulary. Since the definition of truth under an interpre-
tation for second order languages extends that for first order languages, 
any statement expressible in a first order language is expressed by the 
same sentence in the corresponding second order language. 
20 
The other direction takes longer to show, but it is also straight-
forward. Suppose we have made a particular choice of constants, function 
symbols, relation symbols and an interpretation for L2, giving us an in-
terpreted second order language. We will show that there is an interpre-
3 
ted (two-sorted) first order language LI and a translation h mapping the 
formulas of L2 one-one into those of LI such that A and h(A) have the 
same truth conditions. The logical symbols of LI are the usual connec-
tives and quantifiers, = (identity), sort symbols I (for individuals) 
and C (for classes), denumerably many variables x,, x^, . . . of sort I 
and denumerably many variables P^, P^, . . . of sort C. The nonlogical 
symbols of LI are those of L2 with the addition of a two-place relation 
symbol E. Each constant is of sort I. A type is a finite sequence 
(S^, . . .,S, ) of sort symbols, and each n-place function and relation 
symbol has a unique type of length n+1 and n, respectively. In LI the 
type of each n-place function symbol is the n+1-tuple (I, . . .,1). The 
type of = is (1,1), that of E is (I,C) and that of any other n-place 
relation symbol is the n-tuple (I, . . .,1). The formation rules are 
the usual ones, with the addition of type restrictions. If f is a func-
tion symbol and t,, . . .,t are terms, then f(t,, . . .,t ) is a term— 
1 n 1 n 
of sort I—if and only if each t. is of sort I. If R is a relation symbol 
of type (S^, . . .,S ) and t^, . . .,t are terms, then R(tj, . . • ft ) 
is a formula if and only if each t. is of sort S.. 
An interpretation G of LI is a function whose domain consists of 
the sort symbols and the nonlogical symbols of LI and such that 
(1) for each constant c of sort S, G(c) is an element of G(S), 
(2) for each n-place function symbol f of type (S., . . -.S , 
^n+P' G(f) maps G(Sj)X . . .X G(SJ into G(S^^^), 
and 
(3) for each n-place relation symbol R of type (S^, . . '.Sj^). 
G(R) is a subset of G(Sj)X . . .X G(Sj^). 
The definition of truth under an intepretation G employs evaluations map-
ping the variables of sort S to elements of G(S), and the notion of the 
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the satisfaction of a formula relative to an evaluation. The clauses for 
the connectives are the usual ones. The clause for the existential quan-
tification of a variable of sort S is 
Qz) A(z) is satisfied by G relative to evaluation g if 
and only if there is an evaluation g' such that A(z) 
is satisfied by G relative to g', where g and g' differ 
at most in that g(z) ^  g'(z). 
If M = ^D,F^ is the interpretation of L2, we assign LI the inter-
pretation M* defined as follows. Let M*(I) = D, M*(C) =<^(D),'* M*(E) = 
D X^(D) and M*(a) = F(a) for any other nonlogical symbol a of LI. 
The translation h mapping L2 one-one into LI is the natural one. 
If tj, . . .,t are terms and R is an n-place relation symbol, let 
h(R(tj, . . •jt )) = R(t,, . . 'jt ). For any predicate variable P and 
individual variable x., let h(P.x.) = E(x.,P.). For complex formulas let 
h(AAB) = h(A)Ah(B), hC\^ A) = '\.h(A) and h((3z) A) = Qz) h(A). 
Then a formula A of L2 has the same truth conditions under M rela-
tive to an evaluation i as its translation h(A) has under M*,i. Since 
terms and relation symbols receive the same interpretation under M and M*, 
R(tj, . . .,t ) = h(R(t^, . . .,t )) has the same truth conditions in both 
languages. For any individual and predicate variables, Px is satisfied by 
M,i if and only if i(x)€i(P). Since M*(E) = e\x) x/'(D), h(Px) = E(x,P) 
has the same truth conditions under M*,i. For complex formulas we need 
only consider those of the form (3 P) A. (3^) ^  is satisfied by M,i if 
and only if there is an evaluation i' such that A is satisfied by M,i' 
where i and i' differ at most in that i(P) ^  i'(P). Its translation, 
(3 P) h(A), is satisfied by M*,i if and only if h(A) is satisfied by M*,i' 
for some i' of the same type. By the induction hypothesis, these two 
formulas have the same truth conditions. 
This equivalence in the expressive powers of second order and 
first order languages is not restricted to those--like L2--having only 
one-place predicate variables. Some second order languages contain, for 
each natural number n>0, a denumerable number of n-place predicate 
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variables. For any language L2 of this type, there is a corresponding 
first order language in which we can express the same statements. Let 
LI be LI with the addition of a new n+1-place relation symbol E , for 
n i^ J n+1 
each n>l. Each E^^^ is of type (S^, . . .,S^^j), where S^ = I for l<i<n 
^^^^n+1 ~ ^ * Given an interpretation of L2 , the corresponding inter-
pretation is as before, with the added requirement that each E is 
interpreted to be satisfied by a , . . .,a ,a just in case 
^a^, . . ' >^^ € ^n+1* ^^ ^ ^ extend h so that, for an n-place predicate 
variable P,h(P(x^, . . .,x^)) = E^+iCXj, . . .,x^,P), then any sentence 
A of L2^ has the same truth conditions under an interpretation of L2 as 
h(A) has under the corresponding interpretation of LI . 
Theories couched in first and second order languages are also e-
quivalent with regard to provability. Again, one direction is obvious. 
Axioms and rules of inference for a first order language are also axioms 
and rules of inference for (the first order portion of) a second order 
language. Since the sentences of a first order language have the same 
truth conditions in the corresponding second order language, any statement 
provable in a first order language will be provable by the same axioms 
and rules in a second order language. In the other direction, given a 
set Ax of axioms and a set RI of rules of inference defining a theory T2 
in the language of L2, there is a theory TI in the language of LI such 
that |^j;2"A-*-^|-sTYh(A) for any formula A. The axioms of TI are the transla-
tions under h of the axioms of T2. For each rule R of T2, LI has the rule 
R' allowing one to infer h(A) from2^h(B,): iel^ whenever A follows from 
^B.: ielj . Then a formula A is provable in T2 just in case a formula with 
the same truth conditions is provable in TI. LI and L2 do not differ in 
the assertions provable in theories couched in these languages. 
The differences between LI and L2 concern the logical form of their 
sentences. A sentence A of L2 and its translation in LI have the same 
truth conditions and A is provable in some T2 if and only if h(A) is prov-
able in the corresponding TI, but they do not have the same logical form. 
We saw in Chapter I that the definition of truth under an interpretation 
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for a formal language specifies the logical form of its sentences by 
showing how the truth value of a sentence depends on the meaning of its 
significant parts. Here then is the difference between LI and L2. In 
L2 subset is treated as a logical concept. In every interpretation the 
predicate variables range over all subsets of the domain D of the indi-
vidual variables and Px is satisfied by an evaluation i just in case 
i(x)ei(P). We can express the same statements in LI by letting the 
variables of sort C range over the powerset of the domain over which 
the variables of sort I range and taking E to be the restriction of the 
membership relation. But this is not required by the semantics. Any 
sets may be chosen for sorts I and C, and E can be any two-place rela-
tion between their members. 
Their different conceptions of logical form result in different 
consequence relations, that is, h does not preserve the consequence 
relation. For example, consider any sentence of L2 of the form (1) 
(3P) CVx) (Px*-»-Bx), where Bx is any open formula with one free variable 
and P does not occur in Bx. There is a subset of the domain of any 
interpretation containing those elements of the domain which satisfy 
Bx when assigned to x. Since in any interpretation of L2 the predicate 
variables range over all subsets of the domain, (1) is true under every 
interpretation and thus is valid. Given the first order semantics of 
LI, however, there are interpretations of LI under which h(l), that is, 
(3P)(Vx) (E(x,P)-<-^ h(B)), is false. It will be false, for example, under 
an interpretation G in which G(C)C ^(G(I)), G(E) = €^G(I) X G(C) and 
where the subset of G(I) defined by h(B) is not a member of G(C). 
Similarly, L2 and first order languages differ on properties whose 
definition requires quantification over all interpretations. LI is 
complete and compact; L2 is neither. 
The distinction between L2 and LI cannot be drawn on syntactic 
grounds. One might think there is an obvious syntactic difference be-
tween such languages since only in L2 do quantifiable variables appear 
in predicate position. But to distinguish first and second order lan-
guages, 'quantification into predicate positions' must be understood 
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semantically. LI can be rewritten as LI' with primitive formulas of the 
form Px instead of the form E(x,P), while leaving the semantics essen-
tially unchanged. An interpretation of LI' is a function G' whose do-
main contains the sort symbols and nonlogical symbols of LI' and an ar-
bitrary object, say 0. G' provides an interpretation, subject to type 
restrictions, for the sort symbols and nonlogical symbols of LI', and 
G'(0) must be a subset of G'(I) X G'(C). The definition of truth under 
an interpretation is that for LI, with the change that Px is satisfied 
by G',g if and only if <g(x),g(P)^ £ g'(0). To each interpretation G 
of LI there corresponds the interpretation G* of LI' in which G*(a) = 
G(a), when a is a sort symbol or any nonlogical symbol common to LI and 
LI', and G*(0) = G(E). Then each formula of LI has the same truth 
conditions under G,g as its translation in LI' has under G*,g. Since 
this correspondence between interpretations of LI and those of LI' is 
one-one and onto, the translation from LI to LI' preserves logical form 
and logical consequence. LI' is a syntactic variant of LI and is still 
a first order language. Similarly, we could form a second order lan-
guage L2' with all variables in subject position. 
Since LI and L2 differ in their logical form, logical theories 
based on them will give different accounts of logical form and logical 
consequence in natural language. A second order logical theory will 
hold some sentences asserting the existence of sets to be valid, while 
a first order logical theory will not. A theory based on L2 might hold 
(2) 'There is a set P of natural numbers containing 0' to be valid. If 
L2 has a constant 0 and is given an interpretation M = SD,I^ such that 
D is the set of natural numbers and F(0) = 0, then (2) can be formalized 
by the valid second order sentence (3P) PO. (2) can also be formalized 
by QP)E(o,P) = h((3P)P5) in LI under the interpretation M*, but 
(3P)E(o,P) is not valid. Both sentences assert that there is a set of 
natural numbers containing 0 and thus both formalize (2). Yet on the 
first formalization it is valid, while on the second it is a nonlogical 
truth. A second order logical theory need not hold that (2) is valid. 
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for (2) can also be formalized by a nonlogical truth in the first order 
sublanguage of L2. But any second order account of logical form will 
take some sentences employing quantification over sets to be valid which 
a first order account construes as nonlogical truths. The controversy 
here is whether a logical theory based on L2 can provide a correct 
7 
account of logical form and logical consequence in natural language. 
NOTES 
1. For example, take the formulation in Elliott Mendelson's 
Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton, 1964). 
2. We omit subscripts when this will cause no confusion. 
3. The use of a two-sorted first order language is not essential 
since any statement expressible in such a language is expressible in a 
one-sorted first order language with one-place predicates serving the 
function of the sorts. 
4. /TM is the powerset of x. 
5. Since M*(I) = D and M*(C) =^(D), the evaluations of L2 and 
LI are identical. 
6. A formal language is complete if there exists a recursive 
proof procedure P such that A is a logical consequence of X if and only 
if A is provable from X by means of P. A formal language is compact if 
a set X of sentences has a model if and only if every finite subset of 
X has a model. (A model of a set of sentences is an interpretation 
under which every member of the set is true.) 
7. Since both first and second order languages are extensional, 
neither a first order nor a second order account of logical form can 
provide the logical form of sentences containing intensional idioms. 
Accordingly, when comparing these logics we can restrict our attention 
to the extensional portion of natural language. 
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CHAPTER III 
A common feeling is that second order logic—whatever its merits— 
is not as natural as first order logic. In this connection it is salu-
tary to remember that Frege's logical systems were second order. The 
birth of modem logic is usually placed in 1879 when Frege published 
Begriffsschrift, a formula language, modeled upon that of arithmetic, 
for pure thought. In this short booklet Frege presented a formal sys-
tem of the second order predicate calculus. Frege saw no special signi-
ficance in the first order part of his system. Indeed, none of his 
philosophical views would have precluded his using third or fourth order 
quantification if the need had arisen, e.g., if the analysis of some 
concept from arithmetic had required it. 
In this chapter we consider Frege's reasons for employing second 
order quantification in his logical systems. First the role his formal 
systems played in his logicist program is described. After discussing 
some related issues, we reconstruct Frege's justification for his 
second order systems. We then conclude with a brief discussion of the 
view that Frege reduced arithmetic to set theory. 
Frege's great achievement was to develop a formal system in which 
one could exhibit the logical form of sentences involving multiple quan-
2 
tification, like (1) 'Everything is bigger than something.' Before 
Frege, though systems of logic might deal with varying success with the 
propositional connectives or provide a sophisticated system of class 
inclusion, they foundered on the problem of multiple quantification. 
Frege was the first logician to succeed in developing a formalism in 
which one could represent the logical form of such sentences, e.g., in 
which one could distinguish (2) (Vx)(3y)(x is bigger than y) and (3) 
(3y) (Vx)(x is bigger than y) as alternate readings of (1). 
Frege says in the preface to Begriffsschrift that he was led to 
this discovery through his interest in the foundations of arithmetic. 
He wondered whether the laws of arithmetic rest solely on laws of pure 
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logic—on those laws 'upon which all knowledge rests' and, accordingly, 
which contain no reference to 'the particular characteristics of ob-
3 
jects.' He was not interested in how anyone actually came to know the 
laws of arithmetic, but in how those laws could be given their most 
secure foundation. Here Frege did not only want to exclude, e.g., the 
case in which we know that 1+1 = 2 because we accept it on authority 
from our first grade teacher. We may believe this proposition because 
we can derive it from the Peano axioms, which we find self-evident. 
We might even provide the proof in a formal system. Even so, Frege 
would still think it is an open question whether this proof shows the 
ultimate grounds on which this proposition rests. He believed that if 
we could show that 1+1=2 followed from laws that were more basic 
than the Peano axioms, then any derivation from these axioms would not 
constitute the real proof of the proposition, for it would not display 
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the ultimate grounds on which its truth rests. 
Frege attempted to provide the epistemological foundation of the 
truths of arithmetic by showing that they follow from the laws of 
logic. But he soon encountered an obstacle--natural language. In 
attempting to prove some arithmetic truth from laws of logic, how could 
he be certain that he had not tacitly employed any unacknowledged 
assumptions, e.g., which went unnoticed due to their obviousness? 
Without this assurance he could not be certain that the proof didn't 
require some nonlogical assumption. To solve this problem Frege in-
vented a formal language adequate to express the propositions of mathe-
matics. He then provided effective, syntactically specified rules of 
inference and required that each sentence in a proof either be listed 
as an assumption or else result from the application of some rule of 
inference to earlier lines. Frege claimed that his rules of inference 
could be seen to yield only logical consequences of sentences to which 
they were applied. Since these rules were finite in number and effec-
tive, he now had a mechanical means of checking putative proofs. If the 
laws of arithmetic could be derived by means of these rules of inference 
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from logical laws, then Frege could be certain they followed from the 
laws of logic alone. 
To create a formal language in which one could express mathemati-
cal propositions, Frege needed a new analysis of the structure of natu-
ral language. Sentences that were not constructed using the proposi-
tional connectives were traditionally seen as composed out of a subject 
and a predicate. The subject term was held to denote an object and the 
predicate term to denote or express a property. This analysis, however, 
was unable to account for the logical relationships between sentences 
containing either multiple quantification or relation terms. There were 
also problems concerning the denotation of subject terms like 
'something' and 'everything.' 
Frege declared the subject-predicate distinction to be irrelevant 
to a logical analysis of language. Finding a model in the use of func-
tions in mathematics, Frege analyzed sentences into the application of 
(one or more) functional expressions to (one or more) argument expres-
sions. When he wrote Begriffsschrift in 1879, Frege used this model 
intuitively, without possessing a coherent semantic theory. But in 
1891-3 in 'Function and Concept,' 'On Sense and Reference' and the 
first volume of The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Frege developed a sophis-
ticated semantic theory based on this idea. In arithmetic we see 5 as 
the value of the function x+y for the arguments 2 and 3. On the lin-
guistic level, we see '2+3' as a name denoting 5 which is constructed 
out of the proper names '2' and '3' and the functional expression 'x+y'. 
Frege seized on this model for the analysis of certain mathematical 
expressions and, like a good mathematician, generalized it. In the 
first place, he held that a nonmathematical name like 'the capital of 
France' could also be seen as resulting from the completion of the 
functional expression 'the capital of x' by the proper name 'France.' 
The result is a name denoting an object, Paris, which is the value of 
the function denoted by 'the capital of x' when applied to France as 
argument. 
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Frege went on to analyze sentences as formed by the completion 
of a functional expression by the name of an argument. 'John is bigger 
than Mary' could be analyzed as the result of completing the function 
name 'x is bigger than y' by the names 'John', 'Mary' (in that order).^ 
Here Frege held that the value of the function named by 'x is bigger 
than y' for the arguments John, Mary is a truth value. Functions that 
always have a truth value as value for any argument are called concepts. 
If a concept maps an object or pair of objects to the True, then that 
object or pair is said to fall under that concept. 
In addition to first level functions which map (ordered se-
quences of) objects to other objects, Frege held that there are second 
level functions mapping first level functions on to objects. The most 
inrportant exan^les of such functions are the first order existential 
and universal quantifiers. 'John is bigger than something' results 
from completing the second level functional expression Ox)A(x) by the 
first level functional expression 'John is bigger than x'. The corre-
sponding second level function maps a first level function to the True 
just in case there exists some object which the first level function 
maps to the True. 
Frege went on to construe quantification over functions or pro-
perties as a third level function taking second level functions as ar-
guments and having truth values as values. For example, 'There is a 
property F and an object x such that Fx' results by completing the 
third level functional expression 'There is an F such that A(Fx)' by 
the second level functional expression 'There is an x such that Gx.'^ 
This third level functional expression denotes a third level function 
whose value for any second level function as argument is the True just 
in case there exists a first level function which the second level 
function maps to the True--that is, for our example, just in case there 
exists a first level function and an object which this function maps 
to the True. 
30 
This semantics built upon the model of the application of func-
tion to argument allowed Frege to provide an account of the truth con-
ditions of sentences couched in extensional idioms. For any complex 
sentence of this sort Frege's semantics demonstrated how its denotation, 
that is,its truth value, depended upon the denotations of its signifi-
cant parts. Using this analysis, Frege created a formal language in 
which any sentence employing only extensional idioms could be expressed 
once the appropriate simple proper names and simple functional expres-
sions had been added. Since in such a formal language the bewildering 
variety of forms of natural language is replaced by a limited and pre-
cisely specified number of syntactic operations whereby complex sen-
tences are formed, the task of specifying effective, syntactically de-
fined rules of inference is manageable. 
In Begriffsschrift Frege did not have a coherent semantic theory. 
There is a striking contrast in this early work between the sophistica-
tion of his formal system and the primitive nature of his semantics. 
His formal system is a formalization of the second order predicate cal-
culus, containing as a subsystem a complete formalization of the first 
order predicate calculus. But his reflections on semantics are crude in 
comparison with his later views, and at times they are simply confused. 
When writing Begriffsschrift Frege had not yet made a distinction 
between the sense and the reference of an expression. Instead he simply 
speaks of the 'conceptual content' of an expression, explaining that 
this is that part of its meaning which is relevant to determining the 
logical consequences of the expression. He says that he will analyze 
sentences into function and argument, rather than subject and predicate, 
but says little about the nature of functions. Functions are never even 
described as mapping arguments on to the value of the function for those 
arguments. Restricting his attention to those contents which can become 
possible contents of a judgment, he merely says that we obtain a propo-
sition when a function is completed by an argument. 
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Frege illustrates how there are often various ways to analyze an 
expression into a functional expression and one or more argument expres-
sions. Rather than extend this analysis to the content of an expression, 
however, he explicitly defines functions as parts of an expression seen 
as constant and arguments as parts seen as replaceable by other expres-
sions. Yet soon after, he implicitly abandons this account by ex-
plaining (Vx) A(x) as 'for every argument x, A(x) is a fact.' Given 
his account of functions and arguments, this should mean that for every 
expression x as argument, A(x) is a fact. Yet throughout Begriffsschrift 
Frege interprets quantification objectually. For example, he reads 
'X'(\/x) A(x) as 'there are some objects that do not have the property A.' 
In Begriffsschrift Frege barely had the semblance of a theory of 
language and what he had was confused. What Frege did have, in the 
application of function to argument, was a model for the analysis of 
language, however imperfect was his theoretical understanding of that 
model. Using this model, in this first work Frege presents a formal 
system of the second order predicate calculus with identity. He takes 
the material conditional, negation and the universal quantifier as primi-
tive, indicating how the existential quantifier and the other proposi-
tional connectives can be defined. Frege says that we may regard a 
proposition Pc either as a function of the argument c or else as a func-
tion of the argument P. We can thus not only form the judgment, (VK) P(X), 
but also the judgment (yf)f (a). The first is the judgment that, 
whatever object a we take as argument. Pa obtains. In the second judg-
ment we see Pa as a function of the argument P. This judgment is the 
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judgment that, whatever function f we take as argument, f(a) is a fact. 
In Begriffsschrift there are nine axioms schemas, and modus ponens 
is the only rule of inference. Using his account of the truth conditions 
of sentences of his system, Frege argues that each instance of these 
schemas is valid and that modus ponens is sound. In his discussion of 
the use of variables, however, Frege incorporates two further rules: 
the rule of generalization and the rule allowing one to infer A-»(Vx) B 
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from A->B provided that x does not occur free in A. These transforma-
tions are again justified by reference to the truth conditions of sen-
tences. Frege requires that in a proof each step either be an axiom or 
else be obtainable from earlier lines by means of a rule of inference. 
These axioms and rules provide a complete formalization of the first 
order portion of his system. 
The formal system in Begriffsschrift removed the obstacle Frege 
had encountered in attempting to determine if the truths of arithmetic 
were derivable from the laws of logic. The rules of inference of 
Begriffsschrift could be seen to be sound and effective. The soundness 
of the rules assured Frege that any provable proposition is a logical 
consequence of the axioms. Their effectiveness allowed him to obtain 
the certainty he desired, for confronted with an argument he had a 
purely mechanical means of determining, in a finite number of steps, 
whether or not it was a proof. If a check revealed that the argument 
was a proof in his system, then he knew that the conclusion followed 
logically from the axioms and that no extra assumptions had been tacitly 
employed. Since he was confident that his axioms were laws of logic, 
Frege felt justified in maintaining that a proof in his system showed 
that the proposition proved followed logically from the laws of logic. 
With this obstacle removed, Frege could proceed with his reduc-
tion of (cardinal) arithmetic to logic, in which second order quantifi-
cation plays a crucial role in several key definitions. Frege first 
defines 'there are the same number of F's as G's,' which we can abbre-
viate as NxFx = NxGx. Using the same idea Cantor employed, he defines 
df. 
NxFx = NxGx -^ QH) [H is a one-one correspondence between 
the F's and the G's], 
where H is a second order variable. He goes on to define NxFx as 
'the class of concepts G such that G is numerically equivalent to F' 
and 0 as Nx(x?^x). Second order quantification is used again in Frege's 
definition of successor: 
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df 
y is the successor of x -<-> QP) (y = NzPz ^ (^w) (Pw ANz(Pz A z?^ w) 
= X)). 
He then shows that, as defined, 0 and the successor relation have the 
usual properties. Finally, Frege uses second order quantification to 
define the natural numbers. In Begriffsschrift 'y is a member of the R 
sequence beginning with x' is defined as 
y = x V (VP) [(Vw)Wz)(((PwAR(w,z))-+Pz)A(yuXR(x,u)->Pu))^Py].^^ 
That is, y is a member of the R sequence beginning with x if and only 
if either y=x or, for any property P, if P is closed under R and also 
closed under applications of R to x, then y has property P. Using the 
successor relation S(x,y) as defined above, Frege defines 'x is a 
natural number' as 'x is a member of the S series beginning with 0', 
i.e., 
X = 0 V (VP)[(VW)(VZ)(((PWAS(W,Z)->PZ)/\(VU)(S(0,U)^PU))^PX]. 
From this second order definition it is easy to show that complete in-
duction holds for the natural numbers. Second order induction for the 
natural numbers can be expressed as 
(VP)[(PO'^(VW)(VZ)((PWAS(W,Z)>P^)>-(VX)(X is a natural number ->Px)], 
and this can be seen to follow iimuediately from Frege's definition of 
'x is a natural number.' 
We have said that Frege's system in Be gri ffs s chri ft is second 
order and that he provided an account of the logical form of sentences 
of natural language by formalizing them in this system. These claims 
are not so straightforward, however. Unlike the predicate variables in 
L2, those in Frege's system do not range over sets. Frege held that 
they range over concepts and that sets, being objects, are distinct from 
concepts. Also, in Chapter I we said that the logical form of the sen-
tence of a formal language is provided by the definitions of an inter-
pretation and of truth under an interpretation. Yet although Frege pro-
vides an informal specification of the truth conditions of sentences, 
he never uses the idea of an interpretation of a formal language. 
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What we do is consider a formal language for which we have a no-
tion of interpretation and of truth under an interpretation and which 
provides the most faithful modem formulation of Frege's intentions. 
There are several reasons why such a language will be second order. 
First, although Frege held that concepts were never identical with sets, 
on his conception of concepts there is exactly one concept true of just 
the objects in any arbitrary set. Each set is thus associated with a 
unique concept. Second, Frege held that names for concepts and vari-
ables ranging over concepts can never appear in subject position. A 
sentence like (3P)QQ) (P=Q) is not permissible. This is preserved in 
standard formulations of second order logic. Finally, sentences con-
taining predicate variables which Frege held to be logical truths, like 
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(VP) (Par^ Ga), are also logical truths in a modem formulation of 
second order logic. 
Frege created his formal language so that he could have an ef-
fective way of checking the validity of putative proofs. If an argu-
ment is couched in his symbolism and proceeds by the application of his 
rules of inference, then he could be certain that the conclusion is a 
logical consequence of the premisses. If the argument is stated in 
natural language, then to determine if the conclusion A is a logical 
consequence of the set of premisses X we must search in Frege's system 
for a formal proof of A', the formalization of A, from X', the set of 
formalizations of members of X. Since Frege's rules of inference are 
finite in number and effective, we can recognize a proof of A' from X' 
if we find one; and if we do, then we know that A follows logically 
from X. But Frege's system does not provide an effective check for the 
validity of arguments stated in natural language. The formalization of 
sentences of natural language is not an effective operation. The choice 
of a correct formalization requires ingenuity in reducing the various 
constructions in some natural language sentence to the limited number 
available in some formal language. The choice of a correct formaliza-
tion of certain types of sentences may not only not be mechanical, but 
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may pose philosophical problems. An example is the dispute over the 
correct formalization of action sentences, such as 'Jones listened 
19 
carefully to the instructions.' 
If we confine ourselves to the formal language in Begriffsschrift, 
then we can simply check whether a putative proof proceeds by applica-
tion of the rules of inference. If it doesn't, of course, the conclu-
sion may still be provable from the premisses. Yet there is no effec-
tive means to determine whether a sentence in Frege's system is prova-
ble from some set of premisses. All complete formalizations of the 
first order predicate calculus are undecidable, that is, there is no 
mechanical procedure by which to determine in a finite number of steps 
whether or not a given sentence is provable. Since Frege's system 
contains a complete formalization of the first order predicate calculus, 
it is undecidable as well. Further, if some formal sentence B is not 
provable from some set Y, this does not show that B is not a logical 
consequence of Y since Frege's system is not complete. We now know 
that there does not exist a recursive proof procedure for second order 
consequence which is both complete and consistent. Although Frege never 
discussed questions of completeness, he seemed to believe that his sys-
tems were complete. This belief no doubt resulted from his practical 
success in finding a proof of B from Y whenever he had good reason to 
believe that B was a logical consequence of Y. 
But why did Frege think that second order quantification was part 
of logic? Today we are accustomed to thinking of the first order predi-
cate calculus as a 'natural' system. It is not hard to feel that any 
departure from first order logic, at least in the formalization of ex-
tensional idioms, requires special justification. Yet though Frege's 
formal systems were second order, he never felt that the use of second 
order quantification required any special justification or was in any 
way less natural than first order quantification. 
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Now it is not surprising that Frege should have been unaware of 
the philosophical problems surrounding a second order logic. After all, 
even to state these problems we must employ concepts and mathematical 
results which were not available to Frege. Yet unless Frege had good 
reason to believe that second order quantification was part of logic, 
he would have no justification for the claim that he had reduced arith-
metic to logic. 
Actually Frege did possess a justification for the use of second 
order quantification in his system of logic, though this justification 
was stronger at the time he wrote The Basic Laws of Arithmetic than it 
was when he wrote Begriffsschrift. In The Basic Laws of Arithmetic 
Frege possessed a well confirmed semantic theory justifying second 
order quantification. In Begriffsschrift, on the other hand, there is 
no general semantic theory nor even a coherent account of the nature of 
a function. All Frege had, in the application of function to argument, 
was a model for the analysis of language, and one could have employed 
this model without allowing quantification over functions. 
Yet the very success of Begriffsschrift provided justification 
for the use of second order quantification. Using second order quan-
tification, Frege had created a formal language in which he could repre-
sent any proposition of mathematics, including those involving relations 
and multiple quantification. Using this notation he could provide an 
acceptable account of the truth conditions of these sentences. We must 
remember that at this time there was no other logical theory which could 
stand comparison with Frege's. There were many systems of class inclu-
sion, but there was no other logical theory which could provide a gener-
al account of quantification. Today we know that the truth conditions 
of quantified sentences can also be explained by formalizing them in a 
first order language. Any advocate of second order logic must provide 
good reasons why it should be preferred to first order logic. Frege, 
on the other hand, had a strong justification for his second order system 
since it was the only logical system that gave intuitively acceptable 
solutions to problems that had exercised logicians for centuries. 
37 
By the time the first volume of The Basic Laws of Arithmetic 
appeared in 1893, Frege had an even stronger justification for the use 
of second order quantification. For by 1893 Frege could justify the 
use of second order quantification in his logical systems by reference 
to a sophisticated semantic theory. Further, this theory had strong 
support. 
Let us begin with the first point. On Frege's semantic theory 
each significant part of an expression is held to denote some entity. 
The denotation of a complex expression is explained as the result of 
the application of a function to one or more arguments. To take a 
simple case, in an atomic expression of the form R(a,b), the proper 
names a and b denote objects and the relational expression R(x,y) 
denotes a relation. The truth value, or denotation, of R(a,b) is the 
value of the relation denoted by R(x,y) for the objects denoted by a 
and b as arguments (in that order). Since on this theory the proper 
name a denotes an object, there can be no objection to quantifying over 
the position it occupies to arrive at (3x) R(x,b) by existential gener-
alization. But given this semantic theory, the move to QS)S(a,b) is 
equally justified. Just as a refers to an object, R refers to a rela-
tion. If t is a name occurring in a sentence A(t), surely we can form 
the sentence Ok) A(k) which says that there exists an entity which has 
the same properties that A(t) asserts to hold of the denotation of t. 
Once we hold that functional expressions are denoting names, one would 
need a special justification for prohibiting quantification over posi-
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tions occupied by these expressions. 
In addition, Frege's semantic theory was well supported. The 
most important source of this support came from the success of Frege's 
formal systems. In Begriffsschrift an account of the truth conditions 
of sentences is given which employs an intuitive notion of the applica-
tion of function to argument and an explanation of the meaning of the 
connectives and quantifiers. We saw that Frege did not have a coherent 
theory of language until 1891-3. Then he could defend his earlier 
38 
analysis of sentences into connectives, quantifiers and the application 
of function to argument by embedding it in a coherent semantic theory. 
This theory explained connectives and quantifiers as functions of a 
certain kind and provided a general account of the nature of functions, 
the distinction between functions and arguments and the distinction be-
tween functions and objects. The intuitive model which Frege used in 
Begriffsschrift was now replaced by an explicit theory. Since this 
theory justified Frege's formal systems of quantification, the success 
of these systems in turn provided support for this semantic theory. 
An attractive feature of Frege's theory was its great generality 
and simplicity. It not only gave an account of the semantics of exten-
sional contexts, but also made a start at an account of intensional 
contexts. Using the notion of sense, Frege's theory provided an ex-
planation why two sentences may differ only in two extensionally equiv-
alent parts and yet convey different information. All this was achieved 
by a wonderfully simple theory. The only basic concepts are sense, 
reference and the application of function to argument. From this meager 
beginning Frege provided a plausible, coherent semantic theory without 
ad hoc features. 
Finally, this semantic theory received support by being the only 
theory at the time which had a chance of success. Just for a start, no 
other theory could explain the truth conditions of quantified sentences. 
Only Frege's theory even had a chance of providing a correct account, 
e.g., of the truth conditions of the sentences of mathematics. So by 
1893 Frege could defend second order quantification, not only by its 
practical success in Begriffsschrift, but also by reference to the only 
simple, well confirmed semantic theory in existence. Though Frege never 
attempted to justify the use of second order quantification in his logi-
cal systems, he had a strong justification available. Today this justi-
fication is no longer compelling. We now have first order formalizations 
of mathematical theories and have alternative semantic theories which do 
not attribute reference to predicates and functional expressions. In 
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addition, we are aware of metamathematical results concerning the com-
pleteness, compactness and categoricity of (theories couched in) first 
and second order languages which bear on the matter. Frege is under-
standably silent on these issues around which the debate over second 
order logic now centers. 
We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the common 
view that Frege reduced arithmetic to set theory in the belief that set 
theory was logic. There is some truth in this claim--after all, 
Russell's Paradox is derivable in the formal system of The Basic Laws 
of Arithmetic. Yet this view also obscures much that Frege considered 
essential and can only be affirmed with qualification. We will indi-
cate how it must be qualified so that we can reconstruct the way Frege 
saw these issues. 
In discussions of the logicists, second order logic is commonly 
treated as part of set theory. This view has recently been criticized 
by George Boolos in 'On Second-Order Logic' The essential difference 
between set theory and second order logic is that second order logic is 
not an interpreted theory in which we quantify over all sets. It is an 
uninterpreted formal language which can be interpreted in various ways. 
Set theory, on the other hand, is an interpreted theory in which we 
quantify over all sets and formulate assertions about sets using the 
membership relation. 
Even if we refuse to identify second order logic with set theory, 
we must admit that The Basic Laws of Arithmetic did contain a system of 
set theory. Frege held that the extension, or course-of-values, of any 
function is an object. Since Frege held that concepts are functions, 
the course-of-values of, e.g., a first-level concept A(x) is the set of 
ordered pairs <x,>^ such that x is an object and y is the True if x 
falls under A and is the False otherwise. The course-of-values of the 
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function A(x) is 'e(A(E)). Although he had his doubts, Frege laid 
down the infamous Basic Law V which asserts that two courses-of-values 
are identical just in case they are courses-of-values of functions which 
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are extensionally equivalent, that is, 
['ef(e) = 'agCa)] = [(\/x)(f(x) = g(x))].^^ 
In this system we can certainly prove that many sets exist--too 
many as Frege eventually learned. To prove that some extension exists, 
we must produce a function f(x) whose extension it is; then 'ef(e) will 
denote the extension in question. This extension is an object and thus 
an admissible argument to every first-level function, including f(x) 
itself if f(x) is a first-level function. In this way we can generate 
Russell's Paradox. Further, in Frege's theory cardinal numbers are 
identified with certain extensions. These are the main reasons for 
holding that Frege reduced arithmetic to an (inconsistent) formalization 
of set theory. 
Though this picture is essentially correct, there is a major 
qualification which must be kept in mind if we are to appreciate Frege's 
view of these issues. For Frege believed that the use of concepts is 
essential in formulating a theory of sets. He held that concepts are 
epistemologically prior to sets since the only way we can distinguish 
a set of objects from a mere aggregate is by bringing the objects under 
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a concept. What is the difference between the set of states of the 
United States and the set of counties of the United States? They each 
constitute the same physical aggregate. When explaining the concept of 
set, one usually just says that they differ since they have different 
members—the first set has the states as members while the second has 
the counties as members. Frege's view is that we can only understand 
this difference between the two sets by realizing that each set is de-
termined by a concept providing the condition for membership in the set. 
The first set is determined by the concept state of the United States; 
the second by the concept county of the United States. Since it is not 
the case that (Vx) [x is a state of the United States '•<-+ x is a county 
of the United States], the two sets have different members and thus are 
distinct. Their associated concepts provide the criterion of 
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individuation by which we can divide the physical aggregate of the 
United States into the distinct sets of states and counties. 
For this reason Frege would argue that a first order system of 
set theory cannot provide real proofs of propositions concerning sets. 
Nor can it provide proofs of arithmetic propositions if we attempt to 
reduce arithmetic to it. Frege would argue this even if the axioms of 
the theory were known to be true and the rules of inference were known 
to be sound. Frege held that a proof of a proposition provides the 
proposition with its ultimate justification, by showing the most basic 
truths upon which it rests. In this way a proof reveals the epistemo-
logical status of the proposition proved. Since truths about concepts 
are prior to truths about sets, to prove a proposition concerning sets 
by appeal to the axioms of some set theory is not to provide a real 
proof, for it does not exhibit the ultimate grounds on which the propo-
sition rests. Frege would argue that the correct justification, and 
hence the real proof, of propositions concerning sets must start with 
truths about concepts which have these sets as their extensions. Per-
haps a fair summary would be to say that Frege reduced arithmetic to 
a set theory in which the proposition that some set exists can only be 
justified by showing that there exists a concept with this set as its 
extension; and that Frege would have objected on philosophical grounds 
to any set theory not founded upon concepts in this way. 
NOTES 
1. In From Frege to G8del: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 
1879-1931, ed. Jean van Heijenoort (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 1-82. 
2. This requires some qualification. For while the first order 
portion of Frege's system is widely accepted, those who object to higher 
order logic would claim that no sentence of natural language is correctly 
formalized by a sentence of Begriffsschrift containing a second order 
quantifier. Also, since Frege didn't employ the idea of an interpreta-
tion of his system, there is some difficulty in holding that he provided 
the logical form of any sentences. The latter point will be discussed 
shortly. 
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3. Begriffsschrift, p. 5. 
4. Since Frege held the Peano axioms to be logical truths, he 
evidently believed that some laws of logic are more basic than others. 
Frege also takes this absolute view of proof in The Founda-
tions of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin (Evanston, 1968), pp. 2-4. 
This is shown by his speaking of the proof of a proposition. In The 
Basic Laws of Arithmetic, trans, and ed. Montgomery Frege (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1967) this view is less apparent. For example, Furth says 
that there are often several formal proofs of a proposition and implies 
that some may proceed from different premisses. He still holds, how-
ever, that a proof exhibits the epistemological status of the theorem 
proved and goes on to speak of having shown the grounds upon which each 
theorem rests. See Basic Laws, p. 3. 
^* ^^ Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford, 1970), pp. 21-41. 
6, Geach and Black, pp. 56-78. 
7. According to Frege we could also see this expression as com-
posed by application of the functional expression *2+y' to '3' or by 
application of 'x+3' to '2.' 
Frege held that, in a.functional expression like x+y, x and 
y are not actually part of the expression. The functional expression 
is the common element to the names '1+1', '2+1', »2+2', '3+2', . . .; 
that is, the incomplete expression + ' The letters x and y 
are placeholders serving to indicate the kind of supplementation re-
quired. Frege used distinctive letters for placeholders and variables, 
but we use the same letters for both purposes. 
8. This sentence can also be analyzed in other ways. See note 4. 
9. Here A and G are placeholders for a second-level functional 
expression and a first-level functional expression, respectively. 
10. 'If in an expression ... a simple or a compound sign has 
one or more occurrences and if we regard that sign as replaceable in all 
or some of its occurrences by something else (but everywhere by the same 
thing), then we call the part that remains invariant in the expression 
a function, and the replaceable part the argument of the function.' 
Begriffsschrift, p. 22. 
11. Begriffsschrift, p. 27. Further, Frege never claims that the 
substitutional and objectual readings are equivalent. It is clear that 
he never intended the substitutional reading to which his explanation of 
the distinction between function and argument gives rise. 
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12. Frege stipulates that in such a sentence the function varia-
ble only ranges over those functions f such that f(a) is a possible 
content of a judgment. Such sentences therefore contain quantification 
over concepts. 
13. See van Heijenoort's introduction to Begriffsschrift, pp. 2-3. 
He points out that Frege also employs some unstated rules of 
substitution. 
14. This presentation largely follows that in Charles Parsons's 
article, 'Mathematics, Foundations of in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Paul Edwards (New York, 1972), pp. 195-6. 
15. Here the matrix can be expressed using only first order 
quantification. 
16. This is the definition in The Foundations of Arithmetic, pp. 
79-80. That in Basic Laws differs by replacing sets of concepts by sets 
of extensions of concepts (p. 100). 
Although Be gri ffs s chri ft contains no set-theoretic assump-
tions, in his later work Frege believed that the existence of extensions 
of concepts was a principle of logic. 
17. Begriffsschrift, pp. 55, 59 and 69. 
18. This is an instance of Basic Law lib in Basic Laws, p. 105. 
19. See Donald Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences' 
in The Logic of Decision and Action, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh, 
1966), pp. 81-95. 
20. George Boolos in 'On Second-Order Logic,' Journal of 
Philosophy 72 (1975), pp. 509-11 argues persuasively against Quine's 
view that second order quantification is only permissible if functional 
expressions and predicates are names. Our argument merely relies on 
the converse: if such expressions do denote, then second order quanti-
fication is permissible. 
21. Basic Laws, pp. 3-4. 
22. Since Frege's final view was that sentences denote truth 
values, he can use the identity sign instead of the biconditional. 
23. Basic Laws, pp. 29-37. Cf. also Geach and Black, pp. 103ff. 
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CHAPTER IV 
People sometimes claim that logical theories based on L2 should 
be rejected because L2 is not complete. We will argue that the com-
pleteness of first order logic does give it an advantage over L2, but 
not for the reasons usually given. The usual arguments against L2 are 
based on the claim that only in a logical theory based on a complete 
logic are all instances of the consequence relation knowable. This 
epistemological difference is taken to support the general claim that 
we have reason to prefer complete to incomplete logical theories. The 
ability to recognize all instances of the consequence relation might 
be argued to be an a^  priori condition on any acceptable logical theory. 
We might know a priori that an incomplete logic is incorrect. A weaker 
position is that completeness functions like a methodological canon. 
Here we have no assurance that the correct logical theory is complete, 
but all things being equal we adopt complete theories over incomplete 
rivals. If second order logical theories do not have sufficiently 
important compensations, their incompleteness is a reason to reject 
them in favor of first order theories. 
We consider these views in turn and reject them. The importance 
of completeness lies elsewhere. L2 is undesirable because we can never 
recognize a solution to the inference problem if L2 is correct, while 
any complete proof procedure solves this problem for first order logic. 
This conclusion does not show that complete logics are always preferable 
to incomplete logics since it depends on characteristics of L2 which may 
not be common to all incomplete logics. Further, to turn it into a 
convincing rejection of L2 would require resolving difficult issues in 
epistemology and philosophy of science. For this reason we will reject 
L2 on the basis of the less contentious criticism given in Chapter V. 
While contentious, however, the argument in this chapter does provide a 
plausible reason to consider the incompleteness of L2 a liability. 
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A formal logic L is complete if there is a recursive proof pro-
cedure P such that a formula A is a logical consequence of a set X of 
2 
formulas if and only if A is provable from X by means of P. We also 
say that P and any logical theory based on such a logic are complete. 
Since a logical truth is a logical consequence of the empty set, all 
logical truths are provable by a complete proof procedure. 
The philosophical importance of this technical notion is not 
obvious, but the assumptions justifying a proof theoretic approach to 
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the inference problem link it to traditional epistemological issues. 
The crucial assumption is that only a recursively enumerable set of 
sentences can be known. If that is correct and if each axiom in a 
complete proof procedure P is known to be valid and each rule of infer-
ence is known to be sound, then we can recognize each valid formula 
by means of a proof in P. On the other hand, if L is incomplete then 
there are unknowable logical truths. The set of logical truths of a 
logic L is recursively enumerable if and only if L is complete. If 
the set of knowable truths is recursively enumerable, then in an incom-
plete logic some logical truths cannot be known. Since L2 is incom-
plete, if a second order account of logical form is correct then there 
exist unknowable logical truths. 
On one view this consequence of second order accounts of logical 
form provides a conclusive reason to reject them. This view holds that 
an examination of our concept of logical consequence shows that any in-
stance of this relation is recognizable as such. We know a. priori that 
any correct account of logical form and logical consequence must be 
complete. Any relation with unrecognizable instances is not the conse-
quence relation. 
Providing a detailed argument against this view is difficult 
since there is nothing in our informal concept of logical consequence 
to suggest that each instance of this relation can be known. In Chapter 
I we characterized the logical form of a sentence as its semantically 
significant structure. We said that A is a logical consequence of X = 
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J^x^: ielj if the logical form of A and the x. ensures that A will be 
true if each x. is. We then characterized the inference relation using 
the concept of potential knowledge. A can be inferred from X if there 
is an argument by which we can come to know that A is a logical conse-
quence of X. The inference relation consists of the knowable instances 
of the consequence relation. It is clearly included in the consequence 
relation, but why should we think the converse inclusion holds? Logical 
consequence was characterized without mentioning either arguments or 
knowledge, and this characterization provides no reason to believe that 
whenever A is a logical consequence of X there is a valid argument 
demonstrating that A follows from X. 
We can illustrate this by the following consideration. The logi-
cal consequence relation is compact if A is a logical consequence of X 
if and only if A is a logical consequence of a finite subset of X. If 
any correct formalization of logical consequence is complete, then the 
consequence relation must be compact. For if a correct account of logi-
cal consequence is complete, then whenever A is a consequence of X then 
A is provable from X by a complete proof procedure. Since proofs have 
only finitely many premisses, A is provable from a finite subset of X. 
But in lieu of possessing a well confirmed logical theory, we have no 
reason to believe that no instances of the consequence relation depend 
essentially on the presence of infinitely many sentences. Our informal 
characterizations certainly don't imply such a restriction on accounts 
of logical form and logical consequence. We now know that some formal 
logics, like L2, have consequence relations which are not compact. 
Whether such a logic can provide a model for the consequence relation 
in natural language cannot be decided by scrutinizing our informal con-
cept of logical consequence. 
If the view that we know a^  priori that logical consequence and 
inference are coextensive has so little merit, why has it been so common 
throughout the history of philosophy? One reason is that the importance 
of this assumption was not appreciated. Prior to the twentieth century 
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the epistemological assumption that we can know all instances of the con-
sequence relation seemed irrelevant to the choice of a logical theory--
a puzzle for philosophy which logic could safely ignore. Work in the 
twentieth century on the syntax and semantics of formal languages showed 
this position is mistaken. If we assume that consequence and inference 
are coextensive and that only a recursively enumerable set of sentences 
can be known, then we eliminate prima facie plausible characterizations 
of logical form, e.g., those provided by second order logical theories. 
Yet even before the study of formal languages, the importance of 
this assumption might have been realized. We mentioned that the assump-
tion that logical consequence and inference are coextensive implies that 
logical conseuqence is compact. In principle one could have seen that 
this puts substantive constraints on an acceptable theory, for one could 
at least have imagined that there should be a plausible account of logi-
cal form on which the consequence relation is not compact. 
This possibility was never considered, because attention was con-
fined to finite sets of sentences. A typical example is the definition 
7 
of consequence by Pseudo-Scotus. On this definition a consequence is 
a proposition with an antecedent and consequent expressing that if the 
antecedent is true then the consequent must also be true. The idea be-
hind this definition is clear. If we are only concerned with finite sets 
of sentences, whenever A is a logical consequence of 2.^ -., . • ., X V , 
'If X^  '^  . . . A X then A' is a logical truth. This approach won't work 
for infinite sets if sentences are of finite length. Since infinite sets 
of sentences were not considered, the question of the compactness of the 
consequence relation never arose. Modem developments in set theory and 
logic changed these habits of thought. Cantor's work in set theory make 
infinity a topic of mathematical research, and the consideration of 
infinite sets became common. More important, the invention of formal 
o 
languages made the mathematical study of language possible. These de-
velopments made considering infinite sets of sentences natural. 
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Not only was its importance not realized, the assumption that all 
instances of the consequence relation are knowable follows from tradi-
tional assumptions which are no longer as natural as they once were. 
The most common view has been that the truths of logic and mathematics 
are necessary. On this traditional view, if a sentence is necessary then 
its truth depends only on the concepts employed, that is, it is analytic. 
Further, if a truth is analytic then by reflection we can come to know it. 
The reasoning was that since an analytic truth depends only on the rela-
tions between the concepts employed, if we understand it then we lack 
nothing that is necessary in order to discover its truth. All that is 
required is the ability to think rationally about the concepts we possess. 
Hence, the traditional view held that all necessary truths can be known. 
That this assumption might be too optimistic became evident with 
Godel's Incompleteness results for arithmetic, thought to be the paradigm 
of a discipline consisting of necessary truths. Godel showed that the 
first order arithmetic truths do not form a recursively renumerable set. 
If only a recursively enumerable set of sentences is knowable, then the 
Incompleteness Theorem shows that there are necessary truths which cannot 
be known. 
Of course, one can escape this conclusion by denying that know-
ledge is limited to recursively enumerable sets of sentences, but this 
only weakens the case for completeness. If we maintain that all neces-
sary truths can be known, then second order logical truths, being neces-
sary truths about sets, can also be known. We cannot criticize L2 for 
having unknowable logical truths. If, on the other hand, we argue that 
there are unknowable second order logical truths because only a recur-
sively enumerable set of sentences can be known, then the Incompleteness 
Theorem shows that we cannot know all necessary truths. We then have no 
grounds for claiming that all logical truths can be known. In the first 
case, we cannot show that unkonwable second order logical truths exist; 
in the second, we cannot show they are a liability. 
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A defense of completeness considerations in choosing a logic need 
not hold that completeness is a necessary condition on any acceptable 
logic nor must it employ the categories of necessary and a priori truth. 
Another approach would be to treat completeness as a methodological con-
straint on logical theories, functioning as simplicity is usually claimed 
to function in accounts of scientific methodology. We do not know a 
priori that theories exceeding some specified degree of complexity ac-
ording to some accepted measure of simplicity are false. Before formu-
lating and testing alternative theories, we cannot tell how complex the 
correct theory will be. Yet simplicity functions as a substantive con-
straint on theory choice. At the very least, if two theories fare 
equally well on all evidence and on other methodological criteria, then 
we should adopt the simpler of the two. Many think simplicity is so 
important that we should sometimes choose the simpler of two theories 
even if it isn't as well supported on other grounds. 
We can view completeness in this way. Although we cannot demon-
strate a priori that logic is complete, completeness could be held to 
have a certain weight in decisions between logics, so that we should 
only adopt an incomplete logic if it has advantages sufficient to out-
weigh its incompleteness. Various positions are possible on the precise 
status of completeness, depending on the importance accorded to it in 
relation to the other factors relevant in choosing a logical theory. 
Quine seems to view completeness in this way. This approach is 
consistent with his rejection of a priori truth and is suggested by his 
treatment of Henkin's logic allowing branching quantifiers.^^ Quine 
cites reasons why one might choose this logic over first order logic. 
These reasons amount to the argument that for certain sentences of 
natural language, there are formulas of Henkin's logic that capture 
their intuitive meaning better than any formulas of first order logic. 
He then claims that there is an important consideration against adopting 
this logic, viz., it is incomplete. In 'Existence and Quantification,' 
he says that its incompleteness does not prove that Henkin's logic 
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provides an incorrect account of logical form, but the completeness of 
first order logic is an important consideration in its favor. In his 
second discussion Quine goes farther, arguing that--despite the greater 
ability of Henkin's logic to capture the intuitive meaning of sentences 
of natural language—its incompleteness is a sufficiently important 
liability to justify rejecting it in favor of first order quantification 
12 
theory. In the same way, we might ignore a few disconfirming observa-
tions and retain a simple theory over a complex rival having no discon-
firming evidence. 
The view that completeness is a methodological constraint on 
logical theories seems promising until we try to justify this constraint. 
Philosophers have provided various justifications for methodological 
canons, but these types of justification do not support a completeness 
constraint. One can try to justify a methodological canon by appeal to 
intuition, e.g., claiming that it is self-evident that simple theories 
are preferable to complex rivals, all things being equal. But this 
type of justification can only be convincing if the canon is generally 
accepted. Then one might argue that it is self-evident and requires no 
further justification. This approach is attractive in justifying sim-
ple rules of inference on which there is complete agreement. When a 
canon is controversial, appeals to intuition do not help since those 
rejecting the canon do not find it to be evident. This is the situation 
with completeness, where some defend its importance while others think 
it is irrelevant. 
One can also justify methodological canons either inductively or 
as a codification of actual practice. An inductive justification employs 
currently accepted scientific theory to show that the methodological 
canon generally leads to the truth. We might argue that past applica-
tions of this canon led to the adoption of theories that later received 
further confirmation. In discussing simplicity, Quine has argued that 
frequently there are fundamental biases favoring simpler hypotheses, 
both in the experimental criteria of concepts and in the deviations 
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tolerated in the experimental results taken to confirm an hypothesis.•'^ '^  
In this way, one can attempt a 'scientific' justification of a canon of 
scientific methodology.14 
In justifying a methodological canon as a codification of actual 
practice, one argues that the canon is one of the rules we actually 
follow when adopting theories. Quine also advocates this type of justi-
fication of scientific methodology. He has often emphasized that scien-
tific method is but a refinement of common sense, with which it is con-
tinuous. When discussing simplicity, he invariably points out that con-
siderations of simplicity are employed constantly, both in scientific 
and in common sense reasoning. Quine takes this approach to its logical 
conclusion in 'Epistemology Naturalized.' He argues that epistemology 
is simply a part of psychology, being the study of how a human subject, 
starting from an initial input, arrives at a theory of the world. The 
aim is still the traditional epistemological one of determining how 
evidence relates to theory. 
Though these types of justification are often attractive, there 
seems to be no hope of defending completeness in either way. The prob-
lem is that we do not have a sufficiently rich history of choices be-
tween formal logics. Unlike simplicity, completeness is not a consid-
eration in common sense reasoning. As for scientific reasoning, only in 
the twentieth century could one formulate the question of the complete-
ness of a logical theory. Logical systems were not presented formally 
before Frege and even he did not provide a semantic definition of logi-
cal consequence for his systems. Many formal logics have been studied 
in this century, but only the theory of types and first order logic ever 
were generally accepted. This hardly shows a continuing practice sup-
porting completeness as a methodological canon. The theory of types, 
in the 1930's commonly thought to be the correct logic, is not complete. 
First order logic is complete, but its general adoption provides, at 
best, a single example of the use of completeness considerations. And 
in lieu of further choices of complete over incomplete logical systems. 
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we have no reason to think that completeness was, or should have been, a 
factor in the widespread adoption of first order logic. For the same 
reason, we have little evidence for an inductive justification. The 
choice of first order logic over its incomplete competitors is insuffi-
cient evidence to support an inductive justification of completeness.-'•^  
In any case, citing the truth of first order logic as evidence for a 
completeness constraint requires rejecting incomplete alternative logics. 
To reject these logics because of their incompleteness is clearly 
circular. 
There remains a more convincing defense of the importance of com-
pleteness in choosing between logical theories. This defense concerns 
the inference problem. If a logic has a recognizably complete proof 
procedure, then we know that this proof procedure solves the inference 
problem. The adoption of at least certain incomplete logics, in parti-
cular L2, puts us in an unusual situation. A consequence of these 
logics is that we can never recognize a solution to the inference prob-
lem. We argue that this is a reason, all things being equal, to prefer 
recognizably complete logics at least to incomplete logics having such 
undesirable consequences. We then finish this chapter by indicating 
our reservations about this conclusion. 
The inference problem is to codify all inferences, that is, all 
knowable instances of the consequence relation. Employing various 
idealizations and assumptions, we identified this problem with that of 
finding a recursive proof theory generating all inferences. If we know 
that a proof procedure P for a logic L is complete, then P can be seen 
to solve the inference problem for L. Let Prov be the relation of 
provability by means of P and Inf be the inference relation, that is, 
those instances of the consequence relation that can be known. Knowing 
that P is complete, we know that Prov is a subset of Inf, and the infer-
ence relation is clearly a subset of the consequence relation. Since we 
know that any instance of the consequence relation is provable, Prov and 
Inf are known to be coextensive. An example is first order logic where 
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we have recognizably complete proof procedures which therefore solve the 
inference problem. 
An example of an incomplete logic with undesirable consequences 
for the inference problem is L2. If a logical theory based on L2 is 
correct, then we can never recognize a solution to the inference problem. 
Actually, we show a stronger claim to be true. If P solves the infer-
ence problem, that is, generates all knowable instances of the consequence 
relation, then we cannot even recognize that P is consistent. Suppose 
P is a proof procedure for L2, PA2 is the conjunction of the second order 
Peano axioms for arithmetic, GN(X) is the Godel number of X and Con(n) is 
the arithmetical assertion that the proof procedure with Godel number n 
is consistent. We assume that P is presented in the standard manner so 
that we can calculate its Godel number. Let TI be first order Peano 
arithmetic and T2 be the system of second order arithmetic which results 
by adding PA2 as a nonlogical axiom to proof procedure P. Finally, 
assume that we know P proves precisely those formulas known to be second 
order valid. Since P only proves valid formulas, we know 
(1) P is sound. 
PA2 is known to only have models that are isomorphic to the standard model 
of arithmetic. Since all arithmetic truths hold in this model, we know 
(2) PA2-»A is second order valid if A is a truth of arithmetic. 
Our knowledge of the truths of first order arithmetic and our assumption 
that P codifies our knowledge of second order logic shows that 
(3) If hpT ^  ^^®" lpPA2->A. 
Since PA2 is an axiom of T2, (3) implies 
(3') If f^r^ then [^. 
From (1) and the truth of PA2 we have 
(4) T2 is consistent. 
Then (4) and our knowledge of Godelization yields that 
(5) Con(GN(T2)). 
Thus, from (2) and (5) we know that 
(6) PA2-»'Con(GN(T2)) 
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is a valid formula of second order logic. Yet (6) is not provable by P. 
If it were, then in T2 we could prove Con(GN(T2)). But since (3') shows 
that T2 contains elementary arithmetic, we know by Godel's Theorem that 
this is impossible. Since we know that any solution to the inference 
problem is consistent, we cannot recognize a solution if a second order 
account of logical consequence is correct. The adoption of L2 condemns 
us to ignorance concerning one of the fundamental problems facing a 
logical theory. 
The assumption that only a recursively enumerable set of sen-
tences can be known played a crucial role in these conclusions. We em-
ployed this assumption in our construal of the inference problem as the 
task of finding a recursive proof procedure generating all inferences. 
If we could recognize a nonrecursively enumerable set of sentences to be 
valid, and hence true, then a nonrecursive proof procedure would be 
necessary to codify the inference relation. We have not shown that such 
a nonrecursive proof procedure could not be reognized to solve the in-
ference problem. In addition to excluding nonrecursive proof procedures, 
this assumption implies that the inference problem does have a solution. 
Since each recursively enumerable set is generated by a recursive proof 
procedure, there is a proof procedure P generating all inferences. If a 
second order account of logical form is correct, however, we can never 
recognize that P does this. 
We have not shown that first and second order logic are typical. 
There may be complete logics where we cannot recognize a complete proof 
procedure or even know that one exists. All we showed was that if a 
proof procedure is known to be complete, then we also know that it 
solves the inference problem. Similarly, we didn't claim that all in-
complete logics put us in the undesirable situation L2 does. There may 
be incomplete logics having proof procedures we can see codify all know-
able instances of their consequence relations. Their incompleteness 
would be no liability. Thus, we have not drawn the general conclusion 
that completeness is a virtue and incompleteness a vice. 
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The existence of a first order proof theory known to be complete 
and the curious consequences of L2 distinguish this case. We feel that 
the undesirable consequences of L2 are a liability--we require a con-
vincing argument before we will believe we are in such a self-defeating 
epistemological situation. Apart from general arguments for a logical 
theory based on L2, however, we have no reason to believe our situation 
is as self-defeating as second order logical theories would have it. 
These consequences make a second order account of logical form less 
plausible. Proof procedures known to be complete show that first order 
logical theories have more intuitive epistemological consequences. 
These intuitions suggest a methodological canon counseling us to 
prefer the more epistemologically desirable of a pair of theories. That 
is, if theory A has the consequence that we can know more than we could 
if a rival theory B were true, this is a consideration in favor of A. 
It is not conclusive--B may have assets or A have liabilities sufficient 
to offset this advantage. This canon justifies our taking a recogniza-
bly conq)lete proof procedure for first order logic as an advantage when 
we compare it to the undesirable consequences of L2. 
The epistemological desirability of completeness is sometimes 
cited in defense of favoring complete to incomplete logics. Usually, 
however, the argument suggested is not the one we have presented. Our 
argument did not show that complete logics are always epistemologically 
preferable to incomplete rivals. Our more modest conclusion was that 
the existence of a proof procedure known to be complete favored a logic 
to one having the consequence that we can never recognize a solution to 
the inference problem. First and second order logic provide examples 
of such systems. Further argument is needed to establish that they are 
typical of complete and incomplete logics generally. 
One might misconstrue the epistemolgoical consequences of first 
and second order logic by emphasizing our inability to recognize all in-
stances of the second order consequence relation. Restricting ourselves 
to the case of logical truths, all first order logical truths can be 
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known via a recognizably complete proof procedure. Assuming that only a 
recursively enumerable set of sentences can be known, if L2 is correct 
then there are logical truths unknowable in principle. First order logic 
might seem preferable since it has the conseqeuence that all logical 
truths are knowable. 
The reasoning is faulty since the class of logical truths depends 
on the correct logical theory. The unknowable logical truths of a second 
order logical theory remain unknowable, though nonlogical, truths if a 
first order account of logical form is correct. As we saw in Chapter II, 
given a proof procedure for one logic employing only axioms known to be 
true, there is a proof procedure of the same type for the other proving 
formalizations of precisely the same sentences. Any sentence known by 
means of a proof in one logic can be known by a similar proof in the 
other. First and second order logic differ on which of these sentences 
are logically true but not on which can be known. The epistemological 
consequences of these logics do favor first order logic, but not because 
there are unknowable logical truths if a second order account of logical 
form is correct. First order logic has an advantage because a first 
order account of logical form implies that we have a solution to the 
inference problem, while on a second order account we can never recognize 
a solution. 
These conclusions are tentative. To reject second order accounts 
of logical form because of their undesirable epistemological conse-
quences would require more extensive discussion than we have provided. 
We have already mentioned the importance of the assumption that only a 
recursively enumerable set of sentences can be known. This assumption is 
plausible, but a reasoned defense of it is necessary. 
We have argued that the undesirable epistemological consequences 
of L2 are a liability. To turn this claim into an argument against 
logical theories based on L2 we must be more precise concerning the in^or-
tance of epistemological consequences in theory choice. Presumably they 
are not conclusive. We have no a priori assurance that we are not in an 
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undesirable epistemological situation. Epistemological consequences are, 
at best, one factor to be considered when adopting a theory. We will 
only reject a theory with undesirable epistemological consequences in 
favor of a more desirable alternative if this consideration is not out-
weighed by others. To reject L2 for this reason we must state precisely 
what weight should be accorded to epistemological consequences and then 
show that on balance these consequences tip the scales against it. 
A better argument is also needed for the claim that the epistemo-
logical consequences of first and second order logic are even relevant 
when choosing between them. We defended this claim by our intuitions 
concerning our epistemological situation and suggested a methodological 
canon implying it. Each needs a justification. Concerning this pro-
posed methodological canon, we must show that the more epistemologically 
desirable of two theories is more likely to be true. This may be just 
wishful thinking. This canon seems to presuppose that one can argue 
from the desirability of a state of affairs to its reality. Is this any 
more justified when considering scientific theories than when discussing 
social systems? A defense must answer such objections. 
If all this could be done, we would have an argument showing that 
second order accounts of logical form are incorrect. We will not pursue 
this line of argument since an easier path is open. In the next chapter 
we will present a different argument to show that a second order account 
of logical form is unacceptable. This argument is convincing and part 
of its persuasiveness comes from its uncontentious assumptions. It is 
neutral with respect to controversial issues of epistemology and scien-
tific methodology such as those we have just mentioned. We will also 
see that, unlike a recent criticism of L2, it doesn't presuppose a solu-
tion to a complicated dispute on the nature of set theory. This argu-
ment will justify our rejecting second order accounts of logical form. 
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NOTES 
1. This criticism is usually associated with Quine, yet he never 
criticizes L2 in this way. He only cites incompleteness when criticizing 
a logic allowing branching quantifiers, and then his criticism is more 
tentative than one might have expected. See 'Existence and Quantifica-
tion' in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York, 1969), pp. 
108-113 and Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), pp. 89-91. 
2. Often one assumes that a logic comes with a proof procedure, 
and it is called complete if that particular proof procedure is complete. 
The definition we have given is then taken as a definition of a logic 
being completeable. 
3. Sometimes a distinction is made between strong and weak com-
pleteness. The definition in the text is then a definition of strong 
completeness, while a logic is weakly con^ Jlete if there exists a proof 
procedure such that a formula is provable if and only if it is valid. 
4. See Chapter I, pp. 15ff. 
5. We will often discuss the case of validity to simplify the 
exposition. 
6. One could deny that only a recursively enumerable set of sen-
tences is knowable and still maintain that there are unknowable logical 
truths in L2 but not in first order logic. As before, the existence of 
a recognizably complete proof procedure for first order logic shows that 
all first order logical truths are knowable. We might deny that all 
second order logical truths are knowable because of its close relation-
ship with set theory. The truth of various open question of set theory 
is known to be equivalent to the validity of certain second order formu-
las. For example, substitute for the Replacement Schema of ZF the 
following second order sentence: 
OiR) [(Mu) G!v)R(u,v)->(Vz) Gx) (Vy) (yex-^s-Ow) (WEZ A R(w,y))]. 
2 
Let the resulting second order theory be called ZF . Then the continuum 
hypothesis (CH) of ZF is true if and only if ZF^^CH is a valid formula 
of L2. We might argue that the truth or falsity of CH is unknowable and 
thus that there are unknowable logical truths in L2. The issue remains 
whether we have reason to believe that all logical truths can be known. 
7. 'A consequence is a hypothetical proposition composed of an 
antecedent and consequent by means of a conditional connective or one 
expressing a reason which signifies that if they, viz., the antecedent 
and consequent, are formed simultaneously, it is impossible that the 
antecedent be true and the consequent false.' Quoted in I.M. Bochenski, 
A History of Formal Logic, trans. Ivo Thomas (New York, 1970), p. 190. 
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8. Although the invention of formal languages was necessary for 
the mathematical study of language, there is no trace of a mathematical 
treatment of language in Frege's work. Frege created formal languages 
in order to increase the certainty of mathematical results, but he never 
treated these languages as mathematical objects. The consideration of 
infinite sets of sentences became prominent in the early work in model 
theory, in particular in Skolem's extension of Lowenheim's theorem. See 
Skolem's 'Logico-Combinatorial Investigations in the Satisfiability or 
Provability of Mathematical Propositions: A Simplified Proof of a 
Theorem by L. Lowenheim and Generalizations of the Theorem' in From 
Frege to Godel, pp. 252-63. 
9. One could still maintain that if a necessary truth can be 
known at all, then it can be known a priori. Saul Kripke has made a 
persuasive criticism of these traditional connections between necessity, 
analyticity and a prioricity in 'Naming and Necessity' in Semantics of 
Natural Language, ed. Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman (Dordrecht, 
1972), pp. 253-355. The more limited criticism in the text suffices 
for our purposes. 
10. See note 1. 
11. Ontological Relativity, pp. 112-3. 
12. Philosophy of Logic, pp. 90-1. 
13. 'On Simple Theories of a Complex World' in The Ways of 
Paradox and Other Essays (New York, 1966), pp. 242-5. 
14. Such justifications raise the problem of circularity, for we 
are justifying a canon by using accepted scientific theories which may 
in turn receive some of their support from the canon in question. Since 
we will argue that completeness cannot be defended inductively, this 
problem will not concern us. 
15. In Ontological Relativity, pp. 82ff. 
16. This does not show that an inductive justification of a more 
abstract type is not possible, but we do not know of one. 
17. D.A. Martin brought this argument to my attention. 
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CHAPTER V 
In this final chapter we show that logical theories based on L2 
provide an incorrect account of logical form. If quantification over 
the subsets of some set X is construed as second order quantification 
over X, we cannot formalize sentences containing quantification over 
sets containing subsets of X. To do this, quantification over subsets 
of X must be first order. Since we have the ability to quantify over 
ever larger totalities, no formalization employing second order quanti-
fication can be correct. This criticism of L2 is then shown to be more 
compelling than others due to its uncontentious assumptions. We con-
clude by considering whether other higher order logics are subject to 
the same criticism. 
To see that second order logical theories provide an incorrect 
account of logical form, suppose that 
(1) 'There exists a set P of natural numbers containing 0' 
is correctly formalized in L2 by 
(2) C3P) PO, 
where w is the domain and 0 denotes 0. Now consider various contexts 
in which (1) might occur. It might appear in talk about natural numbers 
and sets of natural numbers. Formalizing this discourse in a second 
order language poses no problem. We simply add relation, function and 
constant symbols with appropriate interpretations. Quantification over 
the natural numbers is represented as first order and quantification 
over sets of natural numbers as second order quantification over cu. 
But (1) could also occur in a discourse involving quantification 
over sets containing sets of natural numbers. (1) might be followed by 
(3) 'If any set P of natural numbers contains 0, 
then there is a set Q containing P.' 
A natural second order formalization of (3) is 
(4) Wx)[(CxAOeX)-vQQ)Qx], 
where (DU^W) is the domain, C =^(a)),e is the membership relation re-
stricted to wX^to) and 0 denotes 0.^ We now have a problem. 
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Quantification over sets of natural numbers is interpreted in (2) as 
second order quantification over o), while (4) construes it as first order 
quantification over those objects in the domain satisfying Cx. To for-
malize both (1) and (3) we must change one of our formalizations. There 
is no reason why the assertion that a set contains 0 should have a dif-
ferent logical form in (1) than it has in the antecedent of (3). 
That this is unacceptable is shown by our inability to represent 
instances of the consequence relation. Consider 
(5) 'If any set P of natural numbers contains 0, then there 
is a set Q such that Q contains P and has at least 
two members,' 
which we can formalize by 
(6) (Vx) [(CxA OexXaQ) (QxA Gy) (y?^ xA Qy))]. 
(1) and (5) clearly imply 
(7) 'There exists a set with at least two members,' 
but (2) and (6) don't imply 
(8) C3Q) Qx) Gy) (x?^ y>^  Qx '^Qy). 
In the interpretation-^^a^ ,FS , where F(0) = a and both F(C) and F(e) 
are the empty set, (2) and (6) are true while (8) is false. We cannot 
show that inferring (7) from (1) and (5) is an instance of modus ponens 
unless (1) and the antecedent of (5) receive the same formalization. 
Quantification over P(a)) must be uniformly treated as either first order 
or second order. Either (1) or else (3) and (5) have been incorrectly 
formalized. 
Our only option, however, is to revise our formalization of (1) 
since any formalization of (3) must construe quantification over Pii^) 
as first order. A formalization of (3) will treat quantification over 
sets which contain sets of natural numbers as either first order or 
second order. If treated as first order, the domain will be a superset 
of ^ (fA;a))). (3) might be formalized by 
(9) CM/x) [ (Cx A Oex)->(ay) (xey) ], 
where the domain is a)U/(a))Ui^ (<^ (w)), C and O" are as before and e is the 
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membership relation restricted to the domain. As this formalization 
illustrates, if quantification overfii^in)) is first order then quanti-
fication over P(a)) must be first order as well. 
If we drop (4) in favor of another second order formalization, 
the result is the same. If we construe quantification over sets con-
taining sets of natural numbers as second order, then to formalize the 
assertion that a set Q contains some set x of natural numbers we must 
see quantification over fi^w) as first order and give this assertion the 
form Qx. Whatever the correct formalization of (3), quantification in 
(1) must be interpreted as first order. (2) is therefore an incorrect 
formalization of (1). 
This argument doesn't depend on any special properties of (1). 
An analogous argument shows that any formalization containing a second 
order quantifier is incorrect. Consider any sentence with the form 
(10) . . . there exists a subset P of D such that B . . . 
and suppose that we construe this as second order quantification over D. 
Now consider 
(11) 'There exists a subset P of D and there exists a 
set Q such that B and Q contains P.' 
To formalize (11) we must abandon our formalization of (10). As we 
showed with (1) and (3), whether we construe Q as a first order or as 
a second order variable, quantification over^CD) must be first order. 
Only in this way can we represent the logical form of both (10) and (11) 
in a second order language. 
For any particular sentence, a second order account of logical 
form may hold that all quantification in this sentence is first order. 
But for a second order logical theory to be correct, there must exist 
sentences employing second order quantification. For some D quantifi-
cation over ^ (D) must be correctly formalized as second order. Other-
wise, all sentences receive a correct formalization in the first order 
sublanguage of L2 and thus first order logic is adequate to represent 
the logical form of all sentences of natural language. The addition of 
predicate variables is superfluous. 
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But whenever quantification over subsets of some D is taken to be 
second order we are unable to formalize quantification over sets contain-
ing these subsets. To provide a general account of the logical form of 
natural language, quantification over subsets of any set D must be for-
malized as first order. Since no sentence is correctly formalized by a 
sentence containing a second order quantifier, a second order account of 
logical form is incorrect. 
One might reply to this criticism by arguing that a second order 
account of logical form is correct but that the infinitely many sen-
tences correctly formalized using second order quantifiers are ambiguous. 
Perhaps in some contexts an utterance of (1) 'There is a set P of natural 
numbers containing 0' has the logical form of (2) QP) PO" and in others 
the logical form of the antecedent of (4), that is, 
(12) (ax)(Cx A Oex). 
This would differ from the usual exan^les of ambiguity since if (1) is 
ambiguous between (2) and (12), then in some contexts it is valid while 
in others it is not. 
Yet this view cannot be maintained. If (1) is ambiguous, then 
there must be some objective feature of an utterance of (1) in virtue of 
which it has the logical form it does. The only remotely plausible can-
didate here is the speaker's intentions. But when uttering (1) speakers 
do not intend their quantification either to be first order or to be 
second order. They merely intend to assert that there is a set of natu-
ral numbers containing 0, and this intention is compatible with either 
reading of (1). (2) and (12) have the same truth conditions. Under the 
interpretations given them, both state that there is a set of natural 
numbers containing 0. Yet they differ in their logical form. (2) is 
valid but (12) is not. For any set D as domain and any y in D taken as 
the denotation of 0, there exists a member of (P(J)) containing y. (2) is 
therefore true under every interpretation and is valid. (12) is true 
under the interpretation provided but is false if, e.g., we take the ex-
tension of C to be the empty set. It is a nonlogical truth. 
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But whatever intentions a speaker may have in uttering (1), (2) 
is not a correct formalization of this utterance. If someone replies 
(3) 'If any set P of natural numbers contains 0, then there is a set Q 
containing P,' then to formalize this discourse in a second order lan-
guage we cannot take (2) as our formalization of (1). This is so, re-
gardless of the intentions of the speaker uttering (1). 
Here one can't argue that the second speaker misunderstood the 
first by taking (1) in the sense of (12). Both attach the same intui-
tive meaning to the first speaker's utterance, viz., the claim that 
there is a set of natural numbers containing 0. An indication of this 
is that any speaker uttering (1) would see (3) as an appropriate re-
sponse. Both would also acknowledge that (1) and (5) imply (7), though 
this instance of the consequence relation can only be represented if 
we abandon (2) as our formalization of (1). 
We have argued that quantification over the powerset of any set is 
never correctly construed as second order. One could agree and yet try to 
defend L2 by maintaining that second order quantification only occurs when 
we are quantifying over all properties of the universe V of all sets. Only 
here, one might argue, do we truly treat the values of. our predicate variables 
as properties and as not subject to some later first order quantification. 
But why should we believe in properties of sets? The usual 
reason given is that quantification over properties of sets is necessary 
to provide a truth definition for ZF. We believe that the theorems of 
ZF are true, but we only have an informal account of what this means. 
We might try to avoid the concept of truth by always asserting, e.g., 
that there exists the powerset of any set rather than saying that the 
powerset axiom is true. But our belief in the Replacement Schema can 
only be expressed by saying that each of its infinitely many instances 
is true. So even to express our belief in ZF, we need the concept of 
truth. Yet a truth definition for ZF requires quantification over pro-
perties of sets. The present view is that only quantification over 
such properties is truly second order. 
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Although the solution of the problem of defining truth for state-
ments of set theory does require quantification over properties of sets, 
the notion of property employed in second order logic does not allow a 
satisfactory solution. The concept of property in second order logic 
is that of an arbitrary collection and precisely corresponds to the con-
cepts of subset and subclass. If V is the domain for a second order 
language, then the predicate variables must range over y^(V), the power-
class of V. Like Kelley-Morse set theory, second order ZF is intended 
to describe the structure Ro , in which V and ^ V ) are added as two 
"n+1 ^ •' 
final stages to the cumulative hierarchy. 
But we know that the quantification over classes of sets occur-
ring in Kelley-Morse or in second order ZF does not really allow us to 
solve the problem of truth for set theory--it is merely shifted to these 
new theories. In both second order ZF and Kelley-Morse a truth predicate 
for (first order) ZF can be defined, but then we have the problem of 
defining truth for them. This requires a still more powerful theory 
quantifying over all properties of RQ ^ ^. 
If the need to quantify over properties of sets to provide a 
truth definition for ZF is a reason to believe in properties of sets, 
we have equal reason to believe in properties of Ro^+i* "^"^  quantifica-
tion over these properties, that is, over/?((P(V)), shows that quantifi-
cation over /^ (V) is not second order after all. Whether we treat quan-
tification over fiiPiy)) as first order or as second order, a sentence 
like 'There exists a P in ^ V ) and a Q in fiilPOl)) such that P is a mem-
ber of Q' can only be formalized in a second order language if quanti-
fication over (^ (V) is first order. Quantification over properties is 
necessary to solve the problem of truth for set theory, but the requi-
site notion of property is not that of arbitrary collection. To treat 
properties of sets as arbitrary collections or classes neither allows a 
satisfactory solution to this problem nor avoids the conclusion that 
second order formalizations are incorrect. 
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Our ability to quantify over ever larger totalities shows that no 
quantifier in a sentence of natural language is correctly regarded as 
second order. A first order account of logical form does not have these 
difficulties. Given a set X of sentences to be formalized in first 
order logic, we choose a domain D containing the denotations of all 
names used in X and containing all objects that are quantified over or 
are in the extension of any predicate occurring in a sentence in X. 
If we then want to represent the logical form of other sentences quanti-
fying over objects not in D, e.g., sentences quantifying over /*(D), 
we simply enlarge the domain to include these objects and add whatever 
new nonlogical symbols are needed. Quantification over D remains first 
order. A first order account of the logical form of the sentences in X 
can thus be extended. This piecemeal approach to an account of logical 
form allows us to represent the logical form of ever larger portions of 
natural language. 
In contrast, a second order account cannot be consistently ex-
tended. As in first order formalizations, when formalizing a set of 
sentences in second order logic we choose a domain D. Quantification 
over D is then interpreted as first order and quantification over sub-
sets of D as second order. But this account cannot be extended to sen-
tences quantifying over sets which contain subsets of D. To formalize 
such sentences we must see quantification over subsets of D as first 
order. Second order quantification cannot be part of a general account 
of the logical form of natural language. 
Part of the persuasiveness of this criticism is that it doesn't 
rest on controversial assumptions. In the last chapter we considered a 
criticism of L2 based on its epistemological consequences. Though 
plausible, this criticism assumed controversial views concerning the 
limits of human knowledge and the nature of scientific methodology. 
This criticism is unconvincing to the extent that these views are 
dubious. The criticism we have just presented, however, does not pre-
suppose controversial positions in epistemology or the philosophy of 
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science. Further, unlike a recent criticism of L2 by George Boolos, 
it is also neutral with respect to a conplex dispute over the nature of 
set theory. 
Boolos argues that we cannot formalize assertions about all sets 
in a second order language. Knowing Russell's Paradox, we might find 
the validity of a second order set theoretic sentence like 
(13) (3P)(Vx)[Px<-^ 'V'(xex)] 
surprising. But the model theoretic definition of validity for L2 only 
requires that (13) be true when any set is chosen for domain. Given 
any set D as domain and interpreting e as the membership relation, 
there does exist a subset of D containing all non-self-membered sets. 
Boolos argues that since Russell's Paradox shows that there exists no 
set of all non-self-membered sets, the universe V of all sets cannot be 
taken as a domain for L2. If we took V as a domain for (13) and took P 
to range over all sets of objects over which x ranges, then (13), 
though valid, would be false. 
Boolos concludes that L2 is limited by not being able to provide 
formalizations of assertions about all sets, such as occur in set 
theory. First order logic, on the other hand, is not restricted in 
this way. Although the model theory for first order logic requires an 
interpretation to be a set, Boolos argues that non-set theoretic inter-
pretations are intelligible. He cites first order ZF whose intended 
interpretation is ^ V,E^ , where E is the membership relation. Although 
this interpretation is not a set, he says the axioms of ZF formalize 
true assertions about this structure. Since non-set theoretic interpre-
tations of L2 are not permissible, second order formalizations cannot 
capture the meaning of such set theoretic statements. 
This criticism is problematic since it presupposes a particular 
solution to a controversial dispute on the nature of set theory. The 
presupposition is that the domain of ZF is V and that this is a permis-
sible domain for the first order quantifiers. 'ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel 
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set theory) is couched in the notation of first order logic, and the 
quantifiers in the sentences expressing the theorems of the theory are 
presumed to range over all sets, even though (if ZF is right) there is 
no set to which all sets belong.' This is the most common view of set 
theory. On this view, which sets exist and whether one set is a member 
of another is completely determinate. Accordingly, we can take the 
sentences of ZF at face value, viz., as assertions about ^V,E^ . 
Opposed to this view are a cluster of views receiving increasing 
7 
attention. Common to them is the view that first order quantification 
over V is not coherent since V is not a determinate totality. This 
rests on two claims: one about the first order quantifiers and the 
other about V. The first is that any domain D for the first order 
quantifiers must be a determinate totality, that is, which objects are 
in D must be objectively determined. We may not know what objects are 
in D—we can quantify over collections of which we know little—but the 
meaning of the first order quantifiers makes it clear that the domain 
must be determinate. A sentence of the form (Vx)A(x) is true under an 
interpretation just in case every object in the domain satisfies A(x) 
when assigned to x. This condition only specifies a determinate truth 
value if the domain is a determinate totality. 
This claim is not controversial, but the second one is. The 
second claim is that the totality of sets is not a determinate, but 
merely a potential, totality. V is commonly agreed to have the struc-
ture of a cumulative hierarchy whose stages are indexed by the ordinal 
numbers. The present view maintains that the length of this cumulative 
hierarchy is 'absolute infinity' since the ordinals exhaust our notions 
of infinity. That is, whenever there is a determinate sequence of 
stages of the hierarchy then the length of this sequence is given by 
an ordinal number. Since no ordinal number measures the length of the 
hierarchy itself, V does not have a determinate length and thus is not 
a determinate totality. 
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If this view is correct, then V cannot serve as a domain for the 
first order quantifiers and a new account of the meaning of set theoretic 
statements is needed. Charles Parsons argues that we should continue to 
accept ZF, claiming that we can always interpret a person to be quanti-
fying over a suitably large R when ostensibly making assertions about 
8 
all sets. Or one could claim that assertions about all sets are permis-
sible but that they must be formalized in an intuitionistic logic. 
Other views are possible. The important point for our argument is that 
on these views V cannot serve as a domain for the first order quantifiers. 
The relevance of this dispute in assessing Boolos's criticism is 
clear. Boolos argues that only in first order logic can we formalize 
assertions about all sets. This criticism of L2 assumes that V is a 
determinate totality and thus an acceptable domain for the first order 
quantifiers. But if V is merely a potential totality, then it can no 
more serve as a domain for first order logic than it can for L2. All 
coherent interpretations of either logic would be sets. To evaluate 
Boolos's criticism we must resolve a fundamental controversy over the 
nature of set theory. 
Our criticism avoids this thorny problem—it is neutral with re-
spect to the nature of V. In replying to the view that only quantifi-
cation over all properties of V is truly second order we did assume 
that V was a determinate totality. But simply to take this view serious-
ly we had to suppose that V was determinate and so could be taken as a 
domain for L2. By not presupposing such controversial views, our criti-
cism of L2 is more compelling than either Boolos's or that considered 
in Chapter IV. 
We have shown that second order logic cannot provide the basis 
for a correct account of the logical form of natural language, but what 
about a logic of some higher order? If we are ready to use second order 
quantification, we should have no objection to using third order or even 
higher order quantification if necessary. If quantification over P(D) 
is construed as second order, we could treat quantification over sets 
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containing sets in /^ (D) as third order. (3) might be formalized by 
(VP)[Pa.(aQ)Q(P)], 
where the domain is w and Q is a third order predicate variable. 
To give a general account of higher order logics we need the 
notion of the cumulative hierarchy generated from a set of X, defined by 
Rj(X) = X, 
R^^^(X) = R ^ ( X ) U A R ^ ( X ) ) 
and 
R (X) = U R (X) 
A 3 X 3 11 
where 3 is any ordinal and X any limit ordinal. In any interpretation 
with domain D the (one-place) cx -order variables of a higher order 
12 
logic range over R (D). But an analogous argument to that we gave 
against L2 shows that no higher order logic having predicate variables 
of all orders less than some ordinal a (greater than 2) can be correct. 
Suppose that quantification over R (D) for 3 less than a has been con-
th ^ 
strued as 3 -order. Then how do we formalize sentences containing 
quantification over Rj^ (D)? It would be natural to construe such quanti-
fication as a -order, but we are supposing that there are no a -order 
variables, only variables of order less than a* In order to formalize 
such sentences we must change our formalization of sentences quantifying 
over Rg(D) for some 3 less than a so that we have not exhausted all orders 
of variables when we come to formalize sentences quantifying over Rcj(D). 
If a=3+l for some 3, then quantification over Rg(D) cannot be of order fi 
as claimed. Quantification over Rg^ j^ (D) must be 3 -order or lower and 
so quantification over R3(D) is lower still. If a is a limit ordinal, 
then variables ranging over Ra(D) are of order 3 for some 3 less than a.. 
Then for this 3 variables ranging over Rg(D) must be of an order less 
th 13 
than 3, rather than of 3 -order as we originally supposed. In either 
case, no sentence is correctly formalized as containing 3 -order quan-
tification. The 3 -order variables--and those of higher order if a 
is a limit ordinal—are superfluous. 
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If we want to consider a logic of higher than second order, we 
must consider what we will call On -order logic--a logic containing 
variables of order a for each positive ordinal a. We do not have a con-
+v» 
elusive argument against On -order logic, but we will conclude by 
sketching some of the issues involved. On -order logic has the logical 
constants of first order logic, denumerably many individual variables of 
order 1 and denumerably many one-place predicate variables of order a 
for every ordinal a greater than 1. As with L2, the individual terms 
are identical with the terms of first order logic. A term is either an 
individual term or a variable of order greater than 1. If R is an n-
place predicate then R(t., . . .,t ), u^=U2 and u^(U2) are formulas for 
any individual terms t^, . . .,t and any terms u, and u^. A variable 
of any order may be bound by a quantifier. 
In any interpretation of On -order logic with domain D, the 
a -order variables range over Rj^(D). The interpretations of On -order 
logic are identical with the interpretations of first order logic. If 
14 
D IS a set of individuals, the definition of truth under an mterpre-
tation ^D,F/ is analogous to that for L2, with the a -order variables 
th 
ranging over RQJ(D). If v is an a -order variable, in any interpretation 
a sentence of the form (3v) A(v) is true if there is a set in Rcj(D) 
satisfying A(v). 
There are some differences between On -order logic and L2. The 
orders in On -order logic are cumulative while those in L2 are not. 
For example, in any interpretation <^D,F^ the second order variables of 
On -order logic range over D(J(;^ D); the predicate variables of L2 range 
•f"V» 
over<^(D). Also, On -order logic doesn't impose any conditions of 
stratification on its formulas—t=u and u(t) are formulas for any terms 
u and t. In L2 t=u and v(t) are formulas only if t and u are individual 
terms and v is a predicate variable. 
These differences between On -order logic and our system L2 of 
second order logic suggest a criticism of our argument against second 
order logic. Perhaps our argument relied on the particular formulation 
we chose. A system allowing unstratified formulas might seem to avoid 
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our objection. In such a system (1) could be formalized by 
(14) (3P) [ (Vx) (Px^Nx) A PO] 
and (3) could be formalized by 
(15) (VP) [(Vx) ((PX-+NX)AP0)-^OQ)Q(P)], 
where the interpretation is ^ li^(a)) ,1^ and F is such that F(N)=a) and 
F(0)=0. Here Q and P are both second order variables. If (14) and (15) 
are acceptable formalizations of (1) and (3), then we can formalize (3) 
while still construing quantification over^(co) as second order. Thus, 
a second order logic allowing unstratified formulas might seem to escape 
the criticism we made of L2. 
But the mistake here is that admitting unstratified formulas re-
quires a change in semantics--the semantics for L2 are not appropriate 
for such a system. In providing a definition of truth under an inter-
pretation for On -order logic we said that if the domain is a set of 
individuals then the definition is analogous to that for L2. This re-
striction is necessary, for otherwise there will be isomorphic inter-
pretations satisfying different sentences. For example, let a and b 
be two individuals, P be a second order variable and <<^ 2a.,b3 ,Fy and 
<^ ja, ^ av^ l , F ^ be two isomorphic interpretations. Under a definition 
analogous to that for L2, QP) (3x) (P=x) would be true under the first 
interpretation but false under the second. The problem is that--if we 
allow unstratified formulas and the domain should contain sets—this 
definition doesn't treat these sets as^  if they were individuals. If D 
has the same cardinality as some set of individuals, then we can define 
truth under an interpretation <CD,F^ by saying that a sentence A is 
true in <(p,F^ if there is an isomorphic interpretation <5,F'^ , 
where I is a set of individuals, and A is true in <I,F'^ under a 
definition analogous to that for L2. 
The relevance of this difference in semantics is that (15) under 
^ U A w ) , F ^ does not formalize (3) since (3) is true, while (15) is 
false under this interpretation. (15) is false since it would not be 
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true if the domain contained only individuals."^^ Quite generally, if we 
take Q and P to be second order variables, then 
(16) Q contains P 
cannot be formalized even in an unstratified second order logic. The 
reason is that in any interpretation whose domain is a set of individuals 
(17) Q(P) 
is not satisfied by any evaluation. Yet (16) is true for certain sets 
Q and P. Consequently, though (3) is true, (15) (VP) [(Vx) ((Px-^ Nx) A P0)-> 
QQ)Q(P)] is false under every interpretation. Due to this difference 
in semantics between stratified and unstratified systems, our criticism 
of L2 is also a criticism of unstratified second order logic. 
Can On -order logic provide correct formalizations of natural 
language? One relevant issue is whether the universe V of sets is a de-
•f"V» 
terminate totality or whether in proposing an On -order logic one is 
committed to this view. If so, then On -order logic is incorrect. 
Suppose that for each (positive) ordinal a quantification over Ra(D) is 
claimed to be a -order. If V is determinate then so is On, and this 
implies that U Ra(D) is a determinate totality, (^antification over 
U a^^ -^^  ^^ therefore coherent. Yet sentences containing quantifica-
tion over this totality cannot be formalized unless we change our account 
of the logical form of other sentences. Variables ranging over v Rct(D) 
th 
will be 3 -order for some 3 and thus quantification over Rct(D) for any 
a greater than or equal to 3 can no longer be construed as a -order. 
On -order logic would seem to presuppose that On is a determi-
nate totality. True, any quantification expressible in this logic is 
quantification only over some particular Rot(D). But to specify the syn-
tax and semantics of On -order logic we must quantify over On. When 
specifying its vocabulary we said that for all ordinals a_ there are 
denumerably many variables of order a. If On is not a determinate total-
ity, then this quantification is illegitimate. 
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Perhaps one could avoid this conclusion by treating On -order 
logic itself as merely potential. Whenever a sentence of natural lan-
guage quantifies over some particular Ra(D), this can be formalized as 
th , 
a -order quantification. Rather than contain variables of all orders. 
On -order logic might be held to be indefinitely extendable--for any 
particular ordinal a one can specify, it would have variables of that 
order. 
Another problem is whether On -order logic is leamable. If it 
u r^^th . . . 
has On -many primitive symbols then clearly it is not. Since a logi-
cal theory based on this logic holds that natural language has the 
structure of an On -order language, this would be a conclusive argu-
ment against it. If On -order logic could be intelligibly construed 
as a potential totality providing the logical form of any particular 
sentence we might utter, then this criticism might be avoided. Rather 
than have On -many orders of variables, an On -order language would 
merely have a potentially infinite number of orders. Such a language 
might well be leamable. 
As we add more orders of variables, higher order logics come to 
look more like set theory. Any true statement of ZF in which all 
quantifiers are restricted to particular stages of the cumulative 
hierarchy generated from the set I of individuals can be formalized in 
On -order logic by a logical truth. We simply construe quantification 
over each Ra(I) as a -order quantification. Having come this far in 
construing logic to resemble set theory, we should mention the final 
step in this direction which we will call Ly. Add to first order logic 
denumerably many one-place predicate variables and a two-place predicate 
symbol e. The individual terms are those of first order logic. The 
predicate symbols other than e and = apply only to individual terms, 
while teu and t=u are formulas for any individual terms or predicate 
variables t and u. Both individual and predicate variables may be bound 
by quantifiers. An interpretation of Ly is identical with an interpre-
tation of its first order sublanguage, where e is treated as a logical 
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constant and not assigned a meaning. If D is a set of individuals, then 
a sentence A of Ly is true under an interpretation <^D,F^ if it is true 
when the individual variables range over D, the predicate variables range 
over y^Q R(x(D)> ^ is construed as the membership relation and the remain-
ing predicates, function symbols and constants receive the meaning given 
them by F. 
Ly is simply ZF with individuals expressed in the form of a logic. 
The intended interpretation of ZF with individuals is taken as the range 
of the predicate variables in every interpretation of Ly. Any true 
statement of ZF with individuals can be translated into a valid sentence 
of Ly. Ly has only denumerably many symbols and is clearly leamable. 
Although a logical theory based on Ly presupposes that the cumulative 
hierarchy generated from a set of individuals is a determinate totality, 
Ly has no difficulty in formalizing sentences quantifying over such 
hierarchies. Ly is a particularly clear formulation of the view that 
set theory is logic. If Ly is logic then the usual reductions of mathe-
matics to set theory show that—as the logicists claimed--mathematics 
can be reduced to logic. 
+Vt 
On -order logic and Ly have brought us a long way from second 
order logic, and they might seem far less plausible. In particular, 
many feel that logic should not have the enormous ontological commit-
ments of set theory. What we have shown, however, is that any considera-
tion of higher order logic must concern these systems. A logical theory 
based on second order logic--or on any higher order logic of less than 
On -order—cannot provide a correct account of the logical form of 
natural language. This conclusion does not constitute a general defense 
of first order logic, but it does show it to be superior to its oldest 
rival. 
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NOTES 
1. We have glossed over a minor error here to simplify the exam-
ple. (4) actually does not formalize (3) since in (3) Q ranges over all 
sets, while in (4) it ranges only over subsets ofwU^**^)- This problem 
would be avoided without affecting our argument if (3) and (4) were 
replaced by 
(3') 'If any set P of natural numbers contains 0, then 
there is a set Q of sets of natural numbers 
containing P' 
and 
(4') (\Jx) [ (Cx A Oex)-> (HQ) (\)y) ((Qy^-Cy) A Qx) ]. 
2. D.A. Martin discusses this point in 'Sets versus Classes' 
(manuscript), p. 4. 
3. On is the class of ordinals. The cumulative hierarchy is 
UaeOj^Ra, where RQ = the empty set, Ra+i = P(Ra) and Rx = t'ct<xRa for 
each ordinal a and limit ordinal x. In considering RQ we imagine 
the ordinals extended. ^ 
4. 'On Second-Order Logic,' pp. 514-5. 
5. Here we are assuming that there do not exist classes dis-
tinct from sets, i.e., that if x is a member of y then y is a set. If 
such proper classes do exist, then we could take V as a domain for L2 
and let the predicate variables range over the powerclass of V. But 
Boolos points out that this only shifts the problem: "One of the 
lessons of Russell's Paradox is that if we read 'Xx' as '(OBJECT)X 
bears R to (object) x,' then the range of first order quantifiers in 
second--but not first—order sentences may not contain all OBJECTS" 
(p. 515). 
Assuming that there exist no proper classes, we think the 
correct conclusion is not that certain valid sentences of L2 turn 
false when V is the domain, but rather than we can't even make sense of 
taking V as a domain for L2. We intend the predicate variables of L2 
to range over all arbitrary collections of elements of the domain. 
Yet if there exist no proper classes, when V is the domain there exists 
no appropriate totality for the predicate variables to range over. 
Whichever is the correct conclusion, if there do not exist proper 
classes then V is not a permissible domain for L2. 
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6. Boolos, p. 515. 
7. See Charles Parsons, 'Sets and Classes,' Nous 8 (1974), pp. 
10-11; D.A. Martin 'Sets versus Classes' which criticizes Parson's 
position and Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York, 
1973), Chapter 15. 
8. Parsons, loc. cit. 
9. Saul Kripke proposed this view in conversation. 
10. Kreisel's criticism of formal semantics also assumes that V 
is a determinate totality. (See Chapter I, pp. 11-12). Kreisel argues 
that the usual model theoretic definitions of logical consequence di-
verge from our intuitive concept since they do not consider non-set 
theoretic interpretations, like <V,E> . If any determinate totality 
is a set, however, then all interpretations are set theoretic. If this 
view is correct, then Kreisel has not shown that model theoretic defini-
tions of logical consequence fail to explicate our intuitive concept. 
11. Here the first stage of the hierarchy is Ri(X) rather than 
Ro(X) as is standard. We framed the definition in this way so that the 
first order variables would range over Ri(X), the second order variables 
over R2(X) and so on. 
12. This account of higher order logics diverges from our account 
of second order logic. The differences will be discussed shortly. 
13. Similarly, for any V such that 3<Jf<a, quantification cannot 
be construed as v'^ h-order. It must be 6'^ "-order for some 6 less than 3. 
14. In a moment we will discuss the reason for this restriction. 
15. Cumulative orders and unstratified formulas are necessary 
to avoid problems at limit ordinals. 
16. Richard Montague discusses this problem in defining truth for 
higher order formulas in 'Set Theory and Higher-Order Logic' in Formal 
Systems and Recursive Functions, ed. J.N. Crossley and Michael Dummett 
(Amsterdam, 1965), pp. 145ff. 
Montague rejects the definition we have just given as a 
general definition of truth since it would assume that given any set 
there is a set of individuals having the same cardinality. He provides 
a general definition by using the notion of a model of a system he calls 
'rank-free set theory with individuals.' The definition in the text 
will suffice for our purposes. 
'f'Vi 
Our account of On -order logic has followed Montague's. 
17. We are treating the natural numbers as individuals. 
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